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  Why are so many of the other people with hemophilia I know so young?  
  I’m not entirely sure when this question occurred to me, but I do know that I must have 
been pretty young when it first crossed my mind. Even in elementary school, I realized that older 
men were conspicuously absent from the events that my local hemophilia chapter put on. For 
some events, this absence didn’t strike me as particularly unusual. 50 year old men, after all, 
don’t often show up to watch the latest Shrek movie and eat pizza with 10-year-old boys. But if 
these everyday absences were explainable, the more significant ones were not. Why was it, for 
instance, that older men were so rare at our chapter’s annual meeting? Why did so few of them 
show up for our annual grassroots advocacy trips to Richmond?  
  As a child, I had no idea of the trials and tribulations that older generations of people with 
hemophilia had gone through. I knew that the clotting factor I took to stay healthy was a 
relatively recent invention, and that life without it was painful and dangerous. I knew that things 
had changed a lot even during my lifetime, and that I should be grateful to be born when I was. 
Outside of those basic facts, however, I knew almost nothing about the history of hemophilia. 
My brother and I were cases of spontaneous mutation, meaning that we were the first ones in the 
family to have the disease. Like that out-of-nowhere diagnosis, my understanding of hemophilia 
itself was profoundly de-historicized. 
  As I grew older, I tried to learn more about hemophilia history. In many ways, this thesis 
is merely the latest iteration of that long-running project to better understand the experiences of 
the people who struggled with this disease before I did. When I reached out to those few men 
who were still alive to learn about the many who were not, I learned that the AIDS epidemic 
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devastated whole generations of people with hemophilia who might otherwise still be around 
today. I learned about the various people and institutions that my elders saw as villains 
responsible for the community’s infection, and the various people and institutions they saw as 
heroes who worked to prevent it. Learning these things helped me understand the hemophilia 
community’s history, but it certainly did not help me see myself in it. If anything, learning these 
things made me feel more convinced that my life was unprecedented, more conspicuously aware 
of just how lucky I was to be born when I was. Although I shared a hemophilia diagnosis with 
these men, our day-to-day realities were nevertheless separated by an unimaginable divide.  
  When I began to study this topic, my first forays into the academic literature only 
confirmed that impression. I came across articles with names like “Hemophilia: An Amazing 35-
Year Journey from the Depths of HIV to the Threshold of Cure,” which promised even with their 
titles that the worst was behind us.1 I came across books like Susan Resnik’s indispensable Blood 
Saga, which claimed that people with hemophilia had “emerged from their medical closet and 
approach the biotech century determined to overcome a painful past and savor a bright future.”2 
But even as I encountered these perspectives, I simultaneously began to notice various 
continuities in modern hemophilia care that echoed this difficult history. Although I never 
experienced what it was like to be abandoned by the federal government at the height of a deadly 
epidemic, I did meet people not much older than me who suffered permanent joint damage 
because they could not afford expensive clotting factors and received inadequate care at the ER. 
Although the company I purchased factor from entered the market after the contaminated factor 
 
1 Gilbert C White, “Hemophilia: an amazing 35-year journey from the depths of HIV to the threshold of 
cure,” Transactions of the American Clinical and Climatological Association vol. 121 (2010), 61-75. PubMed 
PMID: 20697550. 
2 Susan Resnik, Blood Saga: Hemophilia, AIDS, and the Survival of a Community, Updated Edition with a New 
Preface (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 191. 
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crisis, I did learn that the corporations which dominated the hemophilia market during the AIDS 
epidemic got off with a virtual slap on the wrist and continue to make billions of dollars by 
selling life-saving medicine to desperate patients. And although I never knew what it was like to 
grow up reliant on a completely unregulated blood supply, I did notice that many of the activists 
who demanded exhaustive safeguards in the aftermath of the AIDS epidemic now bemoaned the 
fact that their hard-fought gains were slowly eroding beneath the weight of history.  
  As I continued to research the contaminated factor crisis, these contradictory perspectives 
on its ongoing significance came to fascinate me. Had the various abuses and oversights that led 
to the hemophilia community’s mass infection with HIV really been vanquished, or had they 
merely been pushed beneath the surface of modern hemophilia politics? Confronting that 
question once again brought me back to the divide between myself and the older men with 
hemophilia, which seemed insurmountable all those years ago. Upon closer inspection, however, 
the gap in hemophilia history appeared more tenuous than ever. I began to think of change over 
time in hemophilia care as part-substantial and part-illusory, and started to interrogate the linear 
progress narratives that divided the past from the present. Without veering into a total 
contrarianism that denied all progress, I began to explore the various ways that hemophilia care 
had not changed rather than the ways that it had. 
  I soon found many more people with hemophilia shared my reservations than I expected. 
Several of the older men whose experiences I had once thought were so alien disputed that 
assessment, and told me that they still see echoes of the AIDS epidemic in the modern realities of 
hemophilia care. Other people my age confessed they also saw certain parallels, though they 
were always quick to preface their remarks with disclaimers that they obviously appreciated just 
how many things had changed. As I returned to the books and articles that emphasized the 
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discontinuities in hemophilia care, I realized that many of them did not reflect these deeply held 
beliefs and reservations that I saw in the community. They were written by relative outsiders to 
our spaces, who were often closer to the architects of hemophilia care than the recipients. They 
drew on a set of sources that excluded certain inconvenient voices, and passed over that 
exclusion in silence. Some of these omissions, these gaps in the archive, were caused by the 
AIDS epidemic itself, which killed nearly half of all people with hemophilia. Compounding that 
problem, however, were key actors implicated in the contaminated factor crisis, who rushed into 
the void left by these absences to impose their own perspectives on the narrative. By burying the 
hemophilia community’s understanding of its own infection beneath layers of “official history,” 
these storytellers have contributed to a distorted recollection about the extent, causes, and 
aftereffects of HIV in the hemophilia community. 
  The hemophilia community’s cultural memory of AIDS is not the only case of 
deliberately manufactured, managed, and curated memory.  In her book Gentrification of the 
Mind: Witness to a Lost Imagination, Sarah Schulman argues that the historiography of 
revolutionary AIDS protest organizations like ACT UP has suffered from a similar 
misapplication of power. As in the story of hemophilia and HIV, institutional history works to 
transmute the “committed battle of thousands of people, many to their deaths” into a false 
narrative of America naturally “coming around” without any external pressure.3 As in the 
hemophilia community, the absence of a fuller history creates a discontinuity in LBGTQ+ 
spaces, which Schulman describes as “a wall between the two groups.”4 Finally, as in 
hemophilia, this deliberate rupture of cultural memory profoundly harms both generations. The 
 
3 Sarah Schulman, Gentrification of the Mind: Witness to a Lost Imagination (Berkley: University of California 
Press, 2012), 9. 
4 Schulman, Gentrification of the Mind, 10. 
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incomplete work of ACT UP organizers was first undermined and then obfuscated by reactionary 
forces that opposed their project, leaving the dead half-forgotten and the living in “a kind of hell 
of confusion and chaos that feels personal but is actually political.”5 The younger generation, by 
contrast, has been deprived of a full understanding of their history, which in turn limits their 
perspectives on the current moment. They live in a world that “tells them that things are better 
than they are,” and stumble forward in relative ignorance of the pitfalls that might lie ahead.6 
  Writing in Schulman’s tradition, I intend this project to chip away at the institutional 
history that both denies the full impact of the HIV epidemic on the hemophilia community and 
maintains a wall between successive generations of people with hemophilia. Unlike Schulman, I 
cannot speak to this history from personal experience. I am a member of the generation that 
comes after the plague, who has “never been that profoundly oppressed” but has nevertheless 
“wanted to understand.”7 This work therefore argues that the official histories of the AIDS crisis 
and hemophilia were distorted by applications of power from historians and capitalist self-
interested drug companies that took advantage of archival gaps to silence dissent, and that this 
deliberate obfuscation disadvantages current activisms. Working toward that understanding 
would have been impossible without many of the prior histories on the epidemic that I depart 
with on certain issues, and as such I want to avoid the urge to overcorrect for institutional bias 
and swing into total contrarianism. My goal is to take advantage of mainstream histories while 
always acknowledging the voices that they exclude, reconciling these disparate schools of 
thought on the epidemic into a more complete whole.
 
5 Schulman, Gentrification of the Mind, 9. 
6 Schulman, Gentrification of the Mind, 11. 




  “A nation’s blood supply is a unique, life-giving resource and an expression of its sense 
of community.”1 So reads the first sentence of the American Institute of Medicine’s report HIV 
and the Blood Supply, a retrospective analysis of one of the deadliest iatrogenic catastrophes of 
the twentieth century. There is more truth in that sentence than its authors may have realized. For 
millennia, people with the disease hemophilia suffered from their condition with no recourse, 
until innovations in the blood supply first realized in the 1930s gradually transformed their 
standard of living. Finally emerging from a time of great adversity and hardship in the 1960s, the 
hemophilia community achieved an unprecedented level of care and wellbeing, all made possible 
by blood products like cryoprecipitate and clotting factor. But these innovations were a double-
edged sword. Clotting factor was far more susceptible to contamination than anyone realized, 
and by the 80s antihemophilic medications were hopelessly contaminated with deadly hepatitis 
and HIV. Industry, government, and community leaders alike all preferred to wait in silence 
rather than blow the whistle when they learned of the risks, all while people with hemophilia 
continued to use factor as if nothing was wrong. By the time anyone thought to warn the 
hemophilia community, it was far too late: more than twelve thousand individuals with 
hemophilia had already treated bleeds with HIV-contaminated product.  
  How could this happen? How could a community’s “unique, life-giving resource” turn 
into the agent of its destruction? Unfortunately, the IOM report raises more questions than it 
answers. HIV and the Blood Supply is provocatively subtitled An Analysis of Crisis 
 
1 Committee to Study HIV Transmission Through Blood and Blood Products, HIV and the Blood Supply: An 
Analysis of Crisis Decisionmaking, Lauren B Leventon, Harold C Sox, Michael A Stoto, eds. (Washington, DC: The 
National Academies Press, 1995), 1. 
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Decisionmaking, yet still purports that “This report does not seek to determine liability or affix 
blame.”2 An “Analysis of Crisis Decisionmaking” that obfuscates the decision-makers may be 
good enough for a safe, political document written to reform policy, but it falls well short of the 
standards of serious historical inquiry. Yet a true account of how this crisis went unremarked and 
unaddressed is far more troubling, because it implicates not only specific actors in the world of 
hemophilia but also the broader American medical system they moved in. In truth, many of the 
decisions that caused the worst outcomes of the HIV crisis had already been made decades 
earlier, during hemophilia’s so-called “golden age.” From its very beginnings, the commercial 
care of people with hemophilia carried within in it the seeds of mismanagement that would 
eventually grow into the HIV crisis. The factor industry is more a product of the pharmaceutical 
market than an aberration of it, and the HIV epidemic should not be dismissed as a one-time 
exception in an otherwise ethical and above-board account of hemophilia care in America. More 
generally, hemophilia care is a microcosm of the broader “world of medicine,” and the tragedies 
that the hemophilia community experienced during the AIDS epidemic reflect the worst impulses 
and outcomes that can arise whenever healthcare is treated as a private business rather than a 
public good. 
A Prehistory of Hemophilia and AIDS 
 Hemophilia is a rare genetic disorder, characterized by an inability to clot. This inability 
is caused by one or more missing factors, components of blood that bond together to form a 
complete seal. If any given factor is missing, the chain of proteins will end at that point and clots 
will not form. Since the blood of a person with hemophilia does not clot properly, that person 
 
2 Leventon, Sox, and Stoto, HIV and the Blood Supply, vi. 
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will bleed longer than individuals with a full array of factors, causing even the smallest injuries 
to become serious concerns when left untreated. The most common “bleeds” (episodes of 
bleeding which overwhelm a person with hemophilia’s clotting abilities) are joint bleeds. If left 
untreated, joints bleeds can do permanent damage to a joint by weakening its synovial 
membrane. The most serious complication, however, is a head bleed, in which the brain itself 
bleeds out. Permanent brain damage or death is common in such circumstances if treatment is 
not administered. Although we now understand that hemophilia can affect anyone, regardless of 
sex or gender, past physicians were not aware of this fact. They conceptualized hemophilia as a 
disease of those assigned male at birth and worked backwards from that assumption, leaving us 
with a historical record that highlights the experiences of men with hemophilia and obfuscates 
the experiences of everyone else. 
  Before the invention of the most rudimentary blood products, life with hemophilia was 
incredibly painful and short. According to historian and hemophilia advocate Susan Resnick, 
“most boys with hemophilia died between the ages of twelve and nineteen.”3 The only existing 
treatment that existed at the time was whole blood. Unfortunately, there was not enough whole 
blood to meet the needs of the hemophilia population, and most patients had difficulty securing 
access. Fortunately for people with hemophilia, things began to change around the end of the 
30s. In 1937, Dr. Bernard Fantus established the first public blood bank in the United States.4 A 
few years later in a small hospital in South Carolina, a doctor named John Elliott discovered that 
blood plasma could be used as a potent alternative to whole blood.5 But these innovations paled 
 
3 Susan Resnik, Blood Saga: Hemophilia, AIDS, and the Survival of a Community, Updated Edition with a New 
Preface (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 16. 
4 Susan Resnik, Blood Saga, 17. 
5 Douglas P. Starr, Blood: An Epic History of Medicine and Commerce (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), 95. 
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in comparison to the changes that came about in the next decade. A war was about to arrive, and 
with it a complete transformation of the blood industry. 
  As America geared up to support its ally Britain and eventually to enter the Second 
World war, the military conscripted hematologists to turn unreliable and unwieldly blood 
transfusion technologies into lean and battlefield-ready medicines. The wartime Committee on 
Transfusion reached deep into academia to find suitable candidates to unlock the potential of 
these therapies, and they struck gold in 1940 when they found Dr. Edwin J. Cohn, a Harvard 
chemist who was quietly studying the various components of blood. Quickly ensconced into the 
military and provided with a generous budget, Cohn discovered how to separate liquid plasma 
into its component derivatives. Cohn’s work, as well as that of other doctors touting the benefits 
of conventional plasma, inspired the military to create a network that could facilitate mass 
donations of blood. By 1943, the Red Cross collected more than a million pints of blood. And in 
1947, Dr. Kenneth Brinkhaus at Chapel Hill demonstrated that Cohn Fraction 1 was rich in a 
blood component called AHF, a strange substance could control the bleeding of people with 
hemophilia.6  
 Although Brinkhaus’s discovery would eventually transform the world of hemophilia, it 
would take some time before other doctors realized the potential of his work. A few lucky 
patients took Cohn Fraction 1, but the vast majority saw doctors who were not hematologists and 
thus did not receive this technology. In truth, the average American hemophilia patient was 
better served by the invention of commercially available plasma. By 1956, the American blood 
system produced over 5 million units of blood.7 This blood came from many sources: some of it 
 
6 Susan Resnik, Blood Saga, 18. 
7 Susan Resnik, Blood Saga, 31. 
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was public blood given out of civic generosity, but increasingly it was private blood that flowed 
from for-profit blood banks that sprang up all across America to accommodate the new role that 
blood played in American medicine. Despite this trend, many people with hemophilia still 
managed to ensure the blood that went into their product came from local blood drives in the 
neighborhood.8 This became increasingly implausible, however, as America moved away from 
its WWII belief that blood donation represented a unique form of patriotic service. Private blood 
banks were far more likely to sell blood that was contaminated with hepatitis, but it barely 
mattered in the face of shortages. As the years passed, private blood banks exploited the shortage 
to muscle into hemophilia care, overcoming progressives like Huey Long who hoped to strangle 
their influence as part of his broader anti-corporate program.9 
  This era also saw the formal beginnings of an institutional “hemophilia community.” In 
1948, the wealthy lawyer and “hemophilia father” Robert Lee Henry created the Hemophilia 
Foundation, which would eventually become the National Hemophilia Foundation (NHF). NHF 
advocated on behalf of a cohort of patients who were for the most part still too young to advocate 
for themselves, soliciting increased funding to educate doctors and fund research grants. It also 
served as a nexus for families, who for the first time could meet others who understood their 
struggles. Although all these changes were welcome, it’s important not to romanticize this era. 
Far too many families were still excluded from this community, either by ignorance of its 
existence or by a color line that remained just as deeply entrenched in hemophilia as in larger 
American society. But for the first time, there was a network of families that we can identify as 
 
8 Steven Pemberton, The Bleeding Disease: Hemophilia and the Consequences of Medical Progress (Baltimore: 
John Hopkins University Press, 2011), 153. 
9 Steven Pemberton, The Bleeding Disease, 164. 
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an early hemophilia community. Together, they supported one another as best they were able and 
waited for a brighter future to arrive. 
  Stanford hematologist Dr. Judith Graham Pool answered the community’s prayers in 
1965 when she discovered cryo-precipitate (also called cryo), a residue that collected at the 
bottom of drained bags of plasma and was incredibly rich in clotting factor.10 Cryo was potent 
and easy to collect: a small lot could be made from the donations of a single donor, and the 
largest lots could be constituted out of twenty donors’ worth of blood. Almost immediately, the 
hemophilia community adopted cryo as the new standard of care. As hemophilia patient Glenn 
Pierce recounted, “With the help of treating bleeding episodes with cryo [I was able] to become a 
normal walking person who was able to function productively, miss less school, and reach a 
point where I could go to college and do well.”11 But as quickly as cryo was created, it was 
replaced by a superior technology. Dr. Brinkhaus, working with the support of Hyland 
Laboratories, discovered a way to make an even more AHF-rich product by distilling the already 
potent cryo. In 1968, Hyland received a patent for the first clotting factor. The dream of a 
“miracle cure” had finally been realized.  
  It is difficult to stress just how important the creation of factor was to the hemophilia 
community. For the first time, people with hemophilia could run, jump, swim, attend school, 
even settle down and have kids. Cryo was an impressive accomplishment, to be sure, and a 
hemophilia community deeply committed to the pursuit of autonomy did amazing things when 
empowered by the 1965 precipitate. But cryo was injected through a drip bag, usually taking 
most of a day to administer. It was next to impossible to travel with cryo, and most patients could 
 
10 Susan Resnik, Blood Saga, 40. 
11 Susan Resnik, Blood Saga, 43. 
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not even administer it at the house. In contrast, factor came in a box small enough to fit easily in 
your hand, and a patient could administer it in the home or on the go. Describing his memories of 
the transition of factor, hemophilia patient Dana Kuhn recalled that “For me to experience Factor 
was: This is like a miracle drug. We can now be normal!”12 But factor products were incredibly 
expensive, often costing tens of thousands of dollars per year in an era where very few 
hemophilia patients had insurance. NHF and the newly formed factor companies worked 
overtime to expand access to factor and to create a medical infrastructure of clinics structured 
around this new treatment. These efforts culminated in Public Law 94-63, a 1975 law that 
created a network of clinics for people with hemophilia called HTCs.13  
 Even as all this was happening, the treatment of hemophilia was changing very quickly, 
in ways that very few patients understood. Factor was so potent it required hundreds if not 
thousands of donors to contribute to each vial, ending any hope of public blood banks providing 
the source plasma. To make matters worse, the companies who produced factor preferred much 
larger batches to maximize efficiency, with the average dose of factor made up of ten to twenty 
thousand individual donors’ contributions.14 Susan Resnik argues that this was the end of what 
social theorist and historian Richard Tiftmuss called “the gift relationship,” an arrangement in 
which donors, doctors, and patients felt an easy bond to one another, united by shared 
humanitarian aims and goals.15 In the new world, hemophilia became a profit-making venture in 
which the demands of the market tore these interests out of alignment with one another, with 
disastrous consequences for the patients. In spite of these changes, very few people with 
 
12 Susan Resnik, Blood Saga, 93. 
13 Steven Pemberton, The Bleeding Disease, 194. 
14 Steven Pemberton, The Bleeding Disease, 229. 
15 Susan Resnik, Blood Saga, 71. 
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hemophilia understood the risks: factor companies went to great lengths to keep the appearance 
of a “community-based treatment” in place, often coordinating initiatives through which a family 
could pay for their product by sponsoring local blood drives.16  
  Although relief for a better therapy was the most common response to these innovations, 
a few members of the hemophilia community did question the new treatment regime. 
Hemophilia father and Russian historian Bob Massie, for instance, was an early and vocal critic 
of post-cryo hemophilia care who called for factor to be distributed as a public good rather than a 
private commodity. Even in 1967, before factor came to market, Massie had met with various 
doctors researching the therapy and come away from the experience convinced that the product 
would be prohibitively expensive. Because most physicians researching factor worked for private 
industry, Massie believed that their employers had little reason to prioritize an affordable 
product. He instead pinned his hopes on Dr. Johnson, a “shadowy figure” at the Red Cross who 
was privately developing his own factor product.17 Despite promising results, however, the Red 
Cross barely bothered to invest in Johnson’s factor research. According to multiple scientists and 
government employees that Massie spoke to, the Red Cross was deliberately slow-rolling the 
development of Johnson’s product because of pressure from Hyland Laboratories, who hoped to 
patent their own similar product first.18 Massie was outraged by this allegation and tried to turn 
the self-sabotaged Red Cross factor therapy into a major scandal in the community, but Hyland 
brought their product to market before Massie’s accusations gained traction.  
 
16 Elaine DePrince, Cry Bloody Murder: A Tale of Tainted Blood (New York: Random House, 1997), 42. 
17 Robert Massie and Suzanne Massie, Journey (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1975), 270. 
18 Robert Massie and Suzanne Massie, Journey, 279. 
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  Even as other members of the hemophilia community celebrated the launch of the Hyland 
product, Massie was still hard at work lobbying for NHF to oppose it. At a meeting between 
NHF, Red Cross, and Hyland representatives where Hyland revealed its prices, Massie was the 
only voice to speak out in protest. Recounting his conversation with the Hyland representative 
Mr. Marquart, Massie recalls that “he was talking about sales, I was talking about joints. 
Sometimes, when I was talking about crippled joints, pain, prophylaxis, and better lives, Mr. 
Marquart smiled sadly at me and said, ‘Mr. Massie, you’re being mean to me.’ Everyone else sat 
silent and looked uncomfortable.”19 Coming away from that meeting, Massie concluded that 
regular access to factor would remain a pipe dream in America’s capitalist healthcare system. 
Convinced that only a national system could save people with hemophilia, he rhetorically asked 
himself “how soon could the American people be persuaded—as every other industrial western 
people has long ago decided—that health care was a social obligation, that keeping citizens 
healthy was every bit as important as teaching them to read and write or paying them welfare 
when they were out of work?”20 When he confronted the question directly, Massie concluded 
that this day would not arrive in time for his son. He decided to emigrate to France not long after 
the Hyland meeting, where he hoped his son would receive better care. 
  Just as privately sourced blood products were more expensive than their public 
counterparts, they were also more dangerous. This danger was only magnified by the widespread 
adoption of plasmapheresis, a previously-niche technology in the field of plasma collection that 
was developed in the early 20th century but only perfected in the 60s to meet increased demand 
for plasma. Plasmapheresis enabled donors to give blood frequently without the risk of anemia, 
 
19 Robert Massie and Suzanne Massie, Journey, 286. 
20 Robert Massie and Suzanne Massie, Journey, 281. 
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thus creating the potential for habitual donors. With older technologies, blood donors could only 
donate six times a year. With plasmapheresis, they could donate one hundred and four times.21 
Using this technology, a new coalition of private blood banks quickly built up their own 
networks all over the country to collect plasma from the most vulnerable and desperate 
populations, often soliciting donations from prisoners and the homeless. In these communities, 
blood banks normalized the idea that donors could supplement their income by giving blood, 
thus attracting donors from populations far more likely to exhibit hepatitis (and later HIV) than 
the average blood donor.22  
  Dr. JG Allen was one of the first scientists to notice the dangers of privately procured 
blood products and sound the alarm. In 1966, he wrote an article warning that “There are groups 
among donor populations whose blood produces more cases of icteric hepatitis than other 
groups. For example, the number of cases resulting from single transfusions when the donors are 
of the prison-Skid Row variety is 10 times greater than the number of cases resulting when the 
donors are volunteers, members of the family or friends.”23 Allen’s analysis of hepatitis-infected 
donors obfuscated the role that America’s classist, racist healthcare and prison systems played in 
producing these outcomes, and instead toed the line of depicting hepatitis infection as a moral 
failure on the part of the donors themselves. But he accurately identified the pattern of hepatitis 
among certain donor populations if not the actual causes of that pattern, and other onlookers 
quickly took notice. The federal government acknowledged Allen’s warnings around the turn of 
the decade, and in 1973 the Assistant Secretary of Health published a National Blood Policy that 
 
21 Steven Pemberton, The Bleeding Disease, 169. 
22 Elaine DePrince, Cry Bloody Murder, 38. 
23 JG Allen, “Post-Transfusion Hepatitis, a Serious Clinical Problem,” California Medicine 104, no. 4 (April 1966): 
297, PubMed PMID: 5551310. 
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admitted “commercial sources of blood and blood components for transfusion therapy has 
contributed to a significantly disproportionate incidence of hepatitis, since such blood is often 
collected from sectors of society in which transmissible hepatitis is more prevalent.”24 Despite its 
mention of “blood components,” the National Blood Policy had nothing to say about specific 
standards for the sanitation of blood products, or the penalties that manufacturers would incur for 
violating those standards. People with hemophilia were still unprotected. 
  The American Association of Blood Banks (AABB), a coalition of private and public 
blood banks founded in 1947, also enabled the proliferation of unsafe blood products by 
lowering their own standards and urging other authorities to follow suit. The AABB and its client 
factor companies lobbied state governments to relax standards of safety and liability for 
collectors and distributors of blood and blood products, often employing lawyers and lobbyists 
with little understanding of the underlying risk. For instance, from 1971 to 1976 twenty six states 
passed legislation creating a higher standard of liability for blood and blood product collectors 
and producers, often through legislative processes in which the blood bank/product industry was 
well represented while no one was present to represent the interests and concerns of 
consumers.25 Using the same arguments they had used to muscle in on the plasma industry, 
blood banks and factor companies created two separate legal spaces: one for public supplies of 
blood, which patients received in one-time donations, and one for private supplies of blood and 
privately procured blood derivatives, which lifetime users like people with hemophilia took to 
survive. 
 
24 Leventon, Sox, and Stoto, HIV and the Blood Supply, 41. 
25 Elaine DePrince, Cry Bloody Murder, 137. 
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  These “blood shield” theories of legal liability were tested in 1977, when the widow and 
children of a person with hemophilia named James Fogo sued Cutter Pharmaceuticals for its role 
in James’s death. Fogo had mild hemophilia and rarely used factor, but during previous dental 
procedures his physicians had noticed extended bleeding episodes in the mouth lasting as long as 
two weeks. When Fogo returned to the hospital for the extraction of a tooth, those same doctors 
recommended that he use a new factor product called Konyne to control bleeding. James died 
from viral hepatitis that he contracted through Konyne less than two weeks after the procedure, 
but the court refused to find Cutter liable despite the clear chain of evidence. During the trial, 
Cutter Labratories’ expert witnesses “acknowledged that the risk of hepatitis is higher in 
commercial than in volunteer plasma, and it is also higher where plasma is pooled.”26 The court 
also found credible evidence submitted by the plaintiffs that “two of the plasmapheresis centers 
from which plasma was obtained were located in slum areas, and that many persons seen 
entering and leaving the centers appeared to be unclean, elderly, transients, alcoholics and 
otherwise debilitated.”27 But despite these facts, the lower court did not find Cutter liable for 
James’s death and the California First Circuit court of appeals upheld their decision. In their 
opinion, the First Circuit noted that “Konyne, despite its hepatitis risk, has been instrumental in 
helping many hemophiliacs with Factor IX deficiencies achieve normal and productive lives.” 
They also accepted Cutter’s rationale that there was an “insufficient number of volunteer donors” 
to supply safe plasma for factor, and cited California’s blood shield law in their determination 
that the use of blood products was for legal purposes a service and not a sale.28 That crucial 
decision meant that Cutter simply was not liable for Fogo’s death, despite their clear negligence 
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in procuring safe plasma. The court’s ruling was clear: factor companies were not responsible for 
hepatitis in their products. 
   These decisions had real consequences. In one painful moment of her harrowing account 
Cry Bloody Murder, “hemophilia mother” and community advocate Elaine DePrince describes a 
difficult conversation between herself and her husband in the early 70s that underscores the costs 
of relying so heavily on private contributions. Her husband pointed out a warning label on a vial 
of factor that states that the factor might contain hepatitis, and worried that perhaps they should 
seek a different treatment. Elaine replied that her husband should not worry: all three boys had 
already been infected with multiple forms of hepatitis!29 These infections made DePrince’s boys 
sick for weeks, bloated their livers, and caused them intense stomach pain.30 For thousands of 
people with hemophilia who would survive AIDS, the hepatitis they were exposed to during this 
period and the AIDS era would ultimately kill them. Yet what choice did patients have? At that 
time, hepatitis was not seen as a major risk to the hemophilia community. Hepatitis A and B 
were believed to be relatively innocuous, while the far more dangerous Hepatitis C and D were 
merely known as the mysterious “non-A, non-B” Hepatitis virus, and marginalized in discussions 
of risk. When asked about the risks of hepatitis in 1976, NHF co-medical director Dr. Louis 
Aledort replied that studies of hemophilia mortality indicated that “Spontaneous bleeding was 
the major cause of demise, with trauma following closely behind.”31 Armed with this data, NHF 
argued that expanding access to factor was more important than worrying about infection. 
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  As the decade continued and no retribution came down from regulatory agencies, factor 
companies became increasingly comfortable acting like the imperial overlords of their new world 
of hemophilia. At the same Hyland Laboratories where factor had been invented just six years 
earlier, Dr. Edward Shanbrom noticed in 1971 that the industrial vats of factor were so 
contaminated that workers who did not even handle the product fell ill with hepatitis. He 
concluded that the vapors alone were contagious enough to infect his workers. Alarmed, 
Shanbrom proposed a new program to monitor the health of his employees.32 Hyland initially 
went along with the program, but discontinued it within two years. Shanbrom resigned in protest, 
and by the mid to late 70s returned to all four major factor companies with a detergent process 
for viral inactivation. None of them adopted his technology. Shanbrom also approached the 
Hepatitis Division of the Centers for Disease Control, but even they were unable to help. 
According to a letter the CDC sent Shanbrom in response, the organization was so under-funded 
in the hostile political climate of the late 70s that they did not have the money to test his 
procedure.33  
  Looking back on the history of hemophilia from the creation of the first blood bank to the 
rejection of Shanbrom’s technology, a clear narrative emerges: key breakthroughs in hemophilia 
treatment only happened when multiple agencies or actors collaborated. Dr. Cohn laid the 
foundation for cryoprecipitate and factor concentrates when he worked with the U.S. 
government. Hematologists who returned from their wartime conscription used the new blood 
bank network they created to supply hemophilia patients with plasma, and people with 
hemophilia succeeded in creating the HTC network when they came together to form NHF. Dr. 
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Pool stood on Cohn’s shoulders to distill cryoprecipitate from his plasma solution, and Dr. 
Brinkhaus stood on Dr. Pool’s shoulders when he collaborated with other scientists at Hyland to 
distill her cryo into clotting factor. Through all of this, government, institutions of higher 
education, the hemophilia community, and private enterprise all played crucial roles. But when 
other institutions retreated from the task of improving hemophilia care and private enterprise was 
given free rein, abuses accumulated. Private blood banks flourished even when they were 
demonstrated to be unsafe, because politicians could not muster the political willpower to close 
them in the face of blood shortages. Factor companies created a business model that maximized 
the risk of hepatitis, and wrote their own crooked legislation to avoid liability. People with 
hemophilia were ill served by all of this, but the risks of this era were too often obscured by the 
remarkable therapies that it produced. 
  The men and women who worked in parallel institutions intimately understood these 
dangers. Dr. Cohn patented his plasma fractions despite an informal prohibition against 
academics taking such measures because he believed that such an act was necessary to protect 
his fractions from “mercenary interests.”34 Writing in 1974, Dr. Pool characterized the new 
blood industry that her cryo made possible as “dangerous, expensive, wasteful, and unethical.”35 
Both have been validated by history. What happened in hemophilia care from 1937 to 1976 alone 
is argument enough that public health and private business must be separated at all costs. But for 
the hemophilia community, the worst was yet to come. Private industry had already hollowed out 
all regulatory checks on the sale of hemophilia medication. The stage was set for a far worse 
infection. 
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HIV Enters the Blood Supply 
  The story of how government, industry, and community figureheads enabled the infection 
of the hemophilia community began in January 1982, with a quiet phone call from an unnamed 
Florida physician to Dr. Bruce Evatt, then Chief of the Host Factors Division at the CDC. The 
unnamed physician reported that one of his patients with hemophilia had died of pneumocystis 
pneumonia, and he was worried that the factor supply had been contaminated with pneumocystis. 
Prior to and then concurrently with his job at the CDC, Evatt had worked in the field of 
hemophilia care for over 15 years. He could not recall any examples of a hemophilia patient 
dying from pneumocystis, but he soon discovered a way to check his recollections. Since the 
Division of Host Factors distributed pentamidine, the only drug that was effective in the 
treatment of pneumocystis, Evatt was able to compare a registry of the patients whom the CDC 
had distributed product to against a list of hemophilia patients. No patients matched, but Evatt 
asked a clerk to keep vigilant for any new requests. By July of that year, two more patients had 
been infected.36 
  Even as this was all happening, a larger epidemic was breaking out across the country. In 
a 1981 CDC Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, the CDC first noticed the “unexpected 
occurrence in five young homosexual Los Angeles men of an unusual and often lethal type of 
protozoan infection of the lung (pneumocystis carnii pneumonia).”37 Quickly dubbed GRID 
(short for Gay Related Infectious Disease and hence referred to by its proper name AIDS), 
opinions were divided in the medical community as to what was causing the infection. Writing in 
the prestigious Lancet, some British doctors blamed “poppers” (amyl and butyl nitrates used as 
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party drugs and during intercourse). In contrast, an unnamed Harvard physician advanced a more 
conventional American position when he wrote that an “overindulgence in sex and drugs and the 
New York City life-style” caused the disease—conveniently ignoring the fact that even in 1981 
AIDS was known to be an international epidemic.38 Of course, it is impossible for us as 
historians to put aside hindsight in questions of discovery, but even hindsight cannot explain how 
so many intelligent men and women missed the potential viral angle. Reflecting on the early 
response to AIDS in 1986, the CDC’s chief director of the HIV task force argued that “not 
everyone took it equally seriously at the beginning…I think a lot of it was the perception of the 
general public, which was echoed by decision makers, that it seemed to be an isolated, unusual 
problem. It was affecting primarily gay men - there were certainly the undercurrents that gay 
men deserved it anyway.”39 This willful ignorance would prove deadly to people with 
hemophilia. 
  Even as other doctors let prejudice blind them to the risks of AIDS, Evatt quickly realized 
the significance of an AIDS symptom that appeared in heavy users of the blood supply. On July 
5, 1982, Evatt wrote to Dr. Aledort of NHF with grave news: he believed that the entire blood 
supply was contaminated with some AIDS-causing virus.40 Evatt had a good basis for his 
pronouncements: he had visited both AIDS-infected hemophilia patients, and neither of them 
seemed to exhibit any of the ordinary risk factors associated with the disease. 41 More worryingly 
still, each of these three patients was on a different brand of factor, or was at least purchasing 
their medication from a factory that no other patient in the group purchased from. In other words, 
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if factor really was the agent of transmission, then at least three separate lots of factor were 
contaminated, with each lot supplying anywhere from five hundred to two thousand five hundred 
unique vials of factor.42 Ten days later, Evatt’s team published their findings in the July 16th 
issue of the CDC’s Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, writing that “Although the cause of 
the severe immune dysfunction is unknown, the occurrence among the three hemophiliac cases 
suggests the possible transmission of an agent through blood products.”43 Evatt immediately 
presented his findings to the Public Health Service, who quickly established an emergency task 
force made up of representatives from the CDC, the NIH, the FDA, NHF, and major blood and 
plasma organizations (including AABB, the four major factor companies, and BPAC, the Blood 
Products Advisory Committee, which was a coalition of doctors affiliated with private blood 
product manufacturers who advised the FDA).  
   Evatt’s work was impressively prescient for its time, and had he and like-minded 
believers in the CDC been taken seriously perhaps the whole history of HIV in America would 
have unfolded differently. Evatt suggested that the causal agent for AIDS was caused by an 
infectious agent that could be transmitted through bodily fluids. What’s more, he also guessed 
that the agent was viral and possibly retroviral based on his knowledge of the cleaning standards 
of factor products.44 But despite this dramatic insight, the July 27th meeting accomplished very 
little. Unhappy with the evidence, other institutions of government and industry refused to heed 
the CDC line. As Evatt recalls, “Obviously there was a tremendous amount of skepticism, 
especially on the part of the blood banks, that this was even a real disease and that we were 
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alarmist in thinking that three hemophiliacs would be even remotely associated with a blood-
borne disease at this time.”45 The CDC wanted to screen donors by sexuality, but gay rights 
groups and factor companies argued that such a decision would represent too drastic a violation 
of civil rights. Despite these setbacks, the members agreed on three basic resolutions. First, 
BPAC member companies should attempt to develop techniques to “decrease or eliminate the 
infectious risks from Factor VII.” Secondly, NHF should inform patients of the scientific 
consensus on HIV and community advocates from the hemophilia and gay communities should 
play a central role in further debates. Finally, the CDC would continue to use the sale of 
pentamidine to track AIDS in hemophilia, as well as create a scientific framework to accumulate 
data about the immunological competence of uninfected hemophilia patients.46 
  Even as the CDC was documenting the infection of the hemophilia community, BPAC 
and AABB were hard at work trying to protect their status quo. Although they withheld this 
information at the July meeting, by 1980 American factor companies had already been offered a 
viral inactivation process by the German factor company Behringwerke AG. Berwingwerke had 
even published their findings in a 1981 issue of German journal Arzneimittel-Forschung, but it 
appears that American regulators did not realize this in 1982.47 Unknown to Behringwerke or 
BPAC, the same heat technology that could mitigate hepatitis would also prove indispensable in 
the fight against HIV. So even as BPAC promised to explore technologies to decrease the risk of 
infection, BPAC members chose to suppress evidence of a technology’s existence rather than 
pay for it. Of course, BPAC representatives dispute this version of events. They point to internal 
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studies they conducted that showed that the resulting product was 90% less effective, even 
though Behringwerke studies only indicated a 50% loss. The Institute of Medicine indicated in 
its retrospective report that “the reasons for the discrepancies in the results obtained by different 
companies in testing this method are not clear.”48 Because of these disparities, community 
advocates like Elaine DePrince have argued that industry manipulated the data to suit their own 
agenda. 49 Although these technologies were too primitive to secure the entire blood supply, the 
fact that major factor companies such as Alpha and Baxter chose to withhold them speaks to how 
normal it was for these institutions to think of themselves as autonomous policy makers who 
decided the direction of blood supply regulation (or lack thereof).  
  Blood banks also did their part to mislead the FDA, launching a massive PR campaign to 
reassure Americans about the safety of the blood supply. In a February 1983 interview with the 
New York Times, chairman of the AABB Dr. Henry Bove underplayed the risks of AIDS, 
arguing that he was concerned but reaffirming that “as a scientist, I have to look at the evidence. 
And the evidence is that ordinary blood transfusions are not transmitting AIDS.”50 However, in 
private Bove took a very different stance. In his concurrent 1983 report to the AABB, he wrote 
that “the most we can do in this situation is buy time. There is little doubt in my mind that 
additional transfusion-related cases and additional cases in patients with hemophilia will surface. 
Should this happen… it will be essential for us to take some active steps to screen out donor 
populations who are at high risk of AIDS. For practical purposes this means gay males.”51 Even 
as Bove privately acknowledged the risk of AIDS in the blood supply and predicted AABB’s 
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eventual embrace of donor deferral, he publicly dismissed all possible links between blood 
products and HIV. 
  Ignorant of these machinations, leaders at NHF moved haphazardly towards a community 
warning system. Unfortunately, these community bulletins rarely gave information that 
accurately portrayed the danger that factor products posed. In the Hemophilia Patient Alert #1, 
published on July 19, 1982, Aledort first told the hemophilia community about the CDC’s 
research but emphasized that “the risk of contracting this immune-suppressive agent is minimal 
(emphasis his) and the CDC is not recommending any change in blood product use.”52 The 
stance was probably disingenuous: in the aftermath of the crisis, Evatt and other HIV researchers 
who worked with NHF like Dr. Don Francis denied ever endorsing the use of factor during the 
time period over which factor was contaminated.53 From then on NHF issued periodic patient, 
chapter, and clinic alerts, but they never really caught up to the scientific dangers that the CDC 
saw in the blood supply. NHF continued to advocate treatment with factor products well into 
1984, although they did eventually urge caution for certain populations. For instance, in Chapter 
Advisory 14 NHF asserted that “if sexual partners of hemophiliacs are at increased risk for AIDS, 
this risk is remote,” despite the fact that even in 1982 Evatt had predicted that AIDS could easily 
be transmitted through heterosexual sex.54  
  NHF was ineffective for a variety of reasons. First, the doctors who made up NHF’s 
medical leadership team were not equipped to understand the significance of the epidemiological 
data that the CDC presented. They were specialists who dealt with patients on an individual 
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basis, and for the first few months of the epidemic they had difficulty putting aside anecdotal 
evidence from their own populations and thinking about the holistic health of the community.55 
Second, leadership in NHF had worked to achieve the dream of “normalcy” for decades, and 
each additional advance had only been made possible through their decision to embrace new 
therapies. Aledort, for instance, had pioneered the concept of the “integrated care” model of 
hemophilia clinic in his home state, where he helped patients achieve access to the factor that let 
them climb out of wheelchairs and throw away crutches and braces.56 In the same vein, patient 
leaders at NHF were also reluctant to believe that the “miracle drug” that had enabled their new 
lifestyle had become a delivery system for one of the most deadly complications that the 
community would ever face. NHF board member Charles Carman, for instance, grew up with 
hemophilia at a time before cryo, and still remembered the days when boys like him were told 
that they “should not venture out of that house.”57 No one who had lived through that era wanted 
to go back to the “bad old days” of hemophilia care, and Carman’s plea for CDC investigators 
not to “take this stuff [blood and factor VIII concentrate] away from us” reflected that deeply 
held priority.58 Finally, NHF increasingly relied on factor companies for financial support, and 
was reluctant to bite the hand that fed them. NHF essentially adopted some of the pharmaceutical 
companies’ attitudes for their own, fooled into a misguided belief that they still shared common 
interests. Describing the ideology of NHF, Resnick writes that “by 1983, viewing blood as ‘a 
product’ within an economic framework was a given.”59  
 
55 Susan Resnik, Blood Saga, 120. 
56 Douglas P. Starr, Blood, 269. 
57 Steven Pemberton, The Bleeding Disease, 145. 
58 Donald Francis, Merle Sande, and John Ziegler, “The AIDS Epidemic in San Francisco: The Medical Response, 
1981-1984, Volume IV,” transcript of an interview by Sally Smith Hughes conducted in 1993 and 1994, AIDS 
Epidemic in SF Oral Histories, The Bankroft Library Oral History Center, The Bancroft Library, available at 
https://oac.cdlib.org/view?docId=kt729005cr&query=&brand=oac4. 
59 Susan Resnik, Blood Saga, 131. 
Hubbert 29 
 
  When Carman urged the CDC not to intervene on the hemophilia community’s behalf, he 
claimed that “We know it’s risky; we’re willing to take the risk.”60 In truth, however, people 
with hemophilia who knew the true extent of the CDC’s projection of HIV in the blood supply 
were few and far between. At this early stage of the epidemic, most patients who did know about 
the risk of clotting factor learned that information from alert healthcare providers. In 
Philadelphia, for instance, Nurse Practitioner Regina Butler heroically stepped into to create a 
donor cryo program for families who heard news of the dangers of clotting factor.61 In Ohio, Dr. 
Ratnoff compared the outcomes between patients who heeded his warnings to adopt cryo and 
those who stayed on factor, eventually publishing his findings and sounding the alarm that factor 
was far more deadly than its primitive counterpart.62 But figures like Butler and Ratnoff were the 
exceptions to the rule, and they faced an uphill battle in their mission to change patient behavior. 
Ratnoff, for instance, immediately told ten of his patients about the risks of HIV when he first 
heard the news. As he later recalled, five of those patients immediately switched to cryo and five 
of them shrugged off his recommendations. One of Ratnoff’s unconcerned patients told the 
doctor that he was “messing with my lifestyle,” and the Ratnoff’s colleagues privately called him 
“hopelessly old-fashioned and conservative” for even broaching the topic in the first place.63 For 
the most part, doctors and patients did not change their behavior, and instead followed the 
medical establishment’s misguided recommendations.  
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  As the infection toll continued to mount, Evatt continued to press the issue of a viral basis 
for AIDS. In October, the MASAC NHF committee was expanded to include the chairpersons of 
other NHF committees. Regina Butler, the chair of the Nursing Committee, recalled that this 
meeting was a turning point in her appraisal of HIV, saying that it was “the exact moment when I 
thought— ‘Oh my god, this is it. This is a horrible thing, and it’s going to kill our patients.”64 
Eight hemophilia patients with AIDS had been identified by the winter of 1982, lending credence 
to Evatt’s theory. More disturbingly, the disease was spreading into the broader blood supply. In 
San Francisco, a baby died of AIDS two years after receiving multiple transfusions of blood. 
When the Irwin Blood Bank reviewed their records to find the sources of the contaminated 
blood, they noticed that one of their donors was a gay man who had already died of AIDS.65 
These two data points satisfied Evatt. He was sure that some virus in blood was at work in these 
AIDS infections, and began preparations for another summit in January.  
 At the January 4, 1983 meeting, the CDC documented the full extent to which the blood 
supply was contaminated. Speaking on behalf of the CDC, Dr. Tom Spira revealed an exciting 
breakthrough—working with the Irwin blood bank, the CDC had demonstrated that the anti-
HBC (hepatitis B) antibody could serve as a surrogate or proxy test for HIV. According to the 
CDC, their research indicated that 90% of AIDS victims also exhibited Hepatitis B antibodies 
that they had developed through past exposure.66 The CDC thought that blood banks and factor 
companies would embrace this technology, but in fact the blood supply was so contaminated that 
adopting such screenings would be nearly impossible. Many industry insiders also worried about 
questions of cost, which they asserted that the CDC undervalued: after all, the testing cost 
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money.67 Gay rights groups also rejected donor deferral and testing, comparing both to 
“miscegenation blood laws” and “the World War II rounding up of Japanese Americans.”68 
   Predictably, these meetings accomplished little. NHF President Louis Aledort went 
along with the factor companies, who tried to appease the CDC by implementing the cheaper 
donor screening while avoiding the costly Anti-HBC test. Once again, experts in different fields 
had difficulty speaking to one another: John Hink wrote a memo in the aftermath of the meeting 
claiming that “experts in other fields paid little attention to these overviews [of hemophilia]… 
for instance it became obvious that few people understood, or cared about the differences 
between blood and plasma collection regulations or procedures.”69 The FDA refused to use their 
regulatory authority to recall factor, preferring to endorse the conclusions of BPAC and privately 
taking the stance that the CDC was manufacturing false controversy in order to avoid funding 
cuts.70 The Red Cross adopted a similar position, arguing in a privately circulated memo that 
“Even if the evolving evidence of an epidemic wanes, the CDC is likely to continue to play up 
AIDS—it has long been noted that CDC increasingly needs an epidemic to justify its 
existence.”71 Outraged by the obvious skepticism and pushback that the CDC’s 
recommendations elicited, Dr. Don Francis of the CDC’s hepatitis lab erupted into a rant that has 
since become famous within the hemophilia community. Banging his fist on the table, Francis 
shouted “How many people have to die? Is three enough? Is six? Is ten? Is a hundred enough? 
Just give us the number so we can set the threshold!”72 Despite the outburst, nothing final was 
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decided at the January conference. Reporting back to his supervisors in the aftermath of the 
meeting, Francis wrote “for hemophiliacs I fear it might be too late. If the T-4/T-8 prevalence 
data collected to date are reflective of pre-AIDS, 1/3 to 1/2 of hemophiliacs might already be 
exposed.”73 
  The failure of the blood banks and factor companies to adopt the CDC protocol at the 
January meeting normalized a level of dysfunction, denial, and corruption that would come to 
epitomize this late era of AIDS in the hemophilia community. The CDC continued to push the 
issue of HIV-contaminated factor products throughout this period, but ultimately the FDA was 
the only agency with the power to intercede. 1983, 1984, and 1985 were lost years, in which the 
FDA disregarded the data of the CDC and instead hitched its cart to the policy proposals of 
BPAC. In one of the most sharply worded critiques in an otherwise bloodless report, the IOM 
commission concluded that “BPAC did not have the social, ethical, political, and economic 
expertise necessary to understand fully the ramifications of the decisions it was making. 
Furthermore, given how much authority FDA in effect has ceded to this advisory group, it did 
not sufficiently represent all potentially affected groups.”74 A less generous interpretation might 
instead indicate that BPAC was little more than a proxy for the interests of factor manufactures, 
and that by adhering to BPAC’s recommendations so closely the FDA essentially let the fox into 
the hen-house.  
  Because of the FDA’s lax approach to their regulatory duty, there was almost no pressure 
on the factor industry to reform during these years. In late 1983, FDA-NIH investigators 
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announced that they believed antigen testing and heat treatment could eliminate all risk of HIV, 
and offered a non-binding recommendation that factor manufacturers adopt these protocols. 
Reporting back to his superiors in the aftermath of that meeting, Steve Ojala of Cutter 
Pharmaceuticals wrote “Mike Rodell of Armour [a factor company] proposed a Task Force to 
deliberate the details of the [FDA’s] recommendation and provide further information in 3 
months… The general thrust of the task force is to provide a delaying tactic for the 
implementation of further testing.”75 There is no evidence that the FDA offered any pushback to 
this “delaying tactic.” The FDA did not do much of anything, in fact, until 1985, when it finally 
used its regulatory authority to demand that factor companies quietly recall their product. Even at 
this late date, factor companies continued to look for any angle to offload their remaining non-
heat-treated factor. In a 1986 memo, an unnamed Cutter senior manager ordered that the 
company get rid of its remaining untreated factor by selling it in Japan and Costa Rica, writing 
that “our current policy for handling the unscreened inventory is to clear our pipeline through 
normal sales [in these regions]… we need the unscreened inventory to meet our 1986 sales 
requirements and want to avoid large writeoffs.”76 
  Amazingly, the National Institutes of Health announced that they had discovered HIV 
before the factor companies even implemented anti-HBC testing, let alone discovered the high-
quality detergent and heating processes they had promised. Speaking on behalf of Health and 
Human Services in 1985, HHS Secretary Margaret Heckler proclaimed that “Those who have 
disparaged this scientific search—those who have said we weren’t doing enough—have not 
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understood how sound, scientific research proceeds.”77 It was little consolation to the hemophilia 
community. Later that year, factor companies would begin heating their product and testing for 
Anti-HBC antibodies, at last coaxed into action by the strides in technology that the CDC made 
while studying heat-treated factor.78 The move came too late for most, however. By 1985, more 
than 12,000 individuals with hemophilia had already been infected.  
 If a nation’s blood supply is truly a “unique, life-giving resource and an expression of its 
sense of community,” then that nation must treat its blood supply like a precious treasure and 
protect it from outside actors who would pervert it towards their own ends. That was the harsh 
wisdom that this new hemophilia community had lost so much to learn. From the 40s to 80s, the 
American government and society gradually defaulted on their promises to defend and uphold 
the safety of the nation’s blood supply, and in their absence private actors sprang up to abuse this 
life-giving resource. From the beginnings of the private blood bank system, industry served 
people with hemophilia poorly whenever it came untethered from government regulation and lost 
sight of the greater good. And as the “gift relationship” crumbled and public support for the 
hemophilia community weakened, private interests became more and more eager to treat people 
with hemophilia as a source of profit rather than as a vulnerable population deserving of aid. 
Hemophilia patients lost their safety as they took on economic value, and in the end inevitable 
exploitation followed, culminating in the FDA’s unerring devotion to the profit-motivated 
decisions of BPAC even in the face of an incipient epidemic. 
 
77 Douglas P. Starr, Blood, 299. 
78 Susan Resnik, Blood Saga, 134. 
Hubbert 35 
 
  During the so-called “golden era” of the 70s, the old bywords of hemophilia care were 
“autonomy” and “normalcy.”79 But the AIDS epidemic changed all of that, inspiring a new 
generation of people with hemophilia to rebel against the system that enabled their infection by 
adopting a new byword of “self-advocacy.” Despite the political conflicts and scandals of the 
past two decades, up until this point patients broadly understood NHF, their doctors, and even 
their factor companies as friendly institutions who served their interests. Now they found 
themselves in a strange new world, surrounded by dying peers, confronted by doctors who 
knowingly prescribed them dangerous medications without discussing the risks, and stymied by 
an NHF so eager to salvage its own reputation that it offered to act as an expert witness against 
members of the community who sued factor companies.80 Perhaps more importantly, thousands 
of people with hemophilia were dying and the world would not even acknowledge who was at 
fault. Working against the very institutions that they once believed sustained them, a new 
generation of people with hemophilia fought for justice for the dead and compensation for the 
living even as they also struggled to survive AIDS and confront the stigma that accompanied the 
deadly disease.
 
79 For a discussion of normality as an ideal in the pre-AIDS hemophilia community, see Pemberton’s The Bleeding 
Disease. 
80 Duncan Barr et. al. to Sherman Fein, November 8, 1985, in “The Trail of AIDS in the Hemophilia Community,” 





  It took time for the hemophilia community to fully grasp the scope of the injury that had 
been done to them. HIV is a disease with a long, long incubation period, meaning that many 
people with hemophilia went years without realizing their HIV status. It is also a disease with an 
enormous stigma that was even more daunting during those early days of the epidemic, meaning 
that many of them did not feel comfortable telling other members of the community about their 
infection. Finally, the backroom decisions that created the potential for HIV in factor products 
were still mostly unknown in 1985, and these lurid facts only came to light after years of 
investigative journalism and litigation. These facets of the hemophilia community’s infection 
with HIV delayed a grassroots response to the epidemic, but they did not prevent it altogether. 
Over the course of the late 80s and early 90s, disgruntled Americans with hemophilia slowly 
came together to create new institutions and organizations capable of addressing aspects of the 
epidemic that they believed previous institutions had ignored. The men and women who made 
these demands held that existing stakeholders in the world of hemophilia had failed to hold the 
wrongdoers responsible for the epidemic to account or even uncovered those actors in the first 
place, and they were prepared to sacrifice their anonymity in order to secure closure and justice 
for the community. By stepping out of the shadows and revealing their HIV status, they forced 
the world to reckon with previously under-examined questions of complicity and justice: who 
was responsible for their infection, and what remedy should America adopt to set things right? 
  But even as these critics demanded answers, there were other actors in the world of 
hemophilia who preferred that these questions not be broached in the first place. The same factor 
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companies, doctors, and professional advocates who many people with hemophilia believed 
enabled the epidemic were also some of the first figures and institutions to chronicle it, and in so 
doing they created an “official story” narrative of hemophilia and HIV that obfuscated their 
complicity and depicted the hemophilia HIV epidemic as an unavoidable tragedy. People with 
hemophilia who held these groups and individuals responsible for their circumstances faced a 
real obstacle, then: in order to secure recognition and justice, they would first have to 
successfully dispute this “blameless” explanation for the ubiquity of tainted blood products in the 
treatment of hemophilia. They rose to this challenge by waging an ideological war on the factor 
companies and their enablers, charging these stewards of the community with dereliction of duty 
in order to fight for justice and reform in a world that was largely unsympathetic to these 
transgressive, anti-capitalist critiques and demands. 
Early Responses to AIDS in the Hemophilia Community 
   The first attempts by members of the hemophilia community to win compensation or 
recognition for their injury were unsuccessful. On November 5, 1985, for instance, the law firm 
of Fein, Schulman, Resnic, Pearson & Esmond served Cutter Laboratories with notice that they 
planned to file litigation on behalf of the estates of three men with hemophilia who had 
contracted HIV through Cutter clotting factor. The firm attempted to wield the threat of a PR 
disaster in order to compel a settlement, writing “we recognize the advantages of an expeditious, 
equitable, and discrete resolution of these claims, and look forward to a timely and productive 
response from Cutter and its liability insurer.”1 Despite these threats, however, Cutter proved 
unreceptive. Their in-house lawyers conceded that “we sympathize with the families of these 
 
1 Sherman Fein to Cutter Laboratories Inc., November 5, 1985, in “The Trail of AIDS in the Hemophilia 
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unfortunate individuals” but went on to write that these litigants “benefited greatly, throughout 
their entire lives, from the product manufactured by Cutter… which allowed these unfortunate 
hemophiliacs to live as close to a normal life as possible.”2 Cutter’s counsel argued that their 
client had done everything in its power to create a safe product, noting that “the AHF 
manufactured by Cutter was done so in strict compliance with all of the requests, guidelines, and 
demands of the National Hemophilia Foundation, which looks after the interests of the 
hemophiliacs of this country.” Cutter’s lawyers felt confident that expert hematologists would 
certainly back up their version of events, warning that “should litigation ensue, I am certain that 
you will find that the leading hematologists in this country will be acting as experts on behalf of 
Cutter Laboratories. In fact, should litigation be commenced in your area, the current Medical 
Director of the National Hemophilia Foundation will act as an expert witness on behalf of 
Cutter.”3 Protected by this expert consensus that Cutter was blameless, their lawyers ended their 
letter to plaintiff’s counsel by reiterating their sympathy for the Puerto Rican families but 
nevertheless concluding that “absent some truly unusual situation, there will not be, and cannot 
be, any settlement of your cases.”4 
  Pharmaceutical corporations like Cutter had good reason to dismiss the threat of a PR 
disaster over contaminated clotting factor products in 1985. Many people with hemophilia still 
accepted that factor was a “miracle cure” that enabled them to live “normal lives,” and viewed 
HIV as an unavoidable cost of that therapy. Even in 1985, NHF’s president Alan Brownstein 
maintained that “despite the understandable fear that people have about AIDS, under no 
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circumstances should they abstain from using clotting factor… The risk of not using clotting 
factor is greater than the risk of AIDS itself.”5 Reflecting on her 15 year old’s son’s HIV 
diagnosis that same year, one mother interviewed by the Boston Globe despaired that “It’s not as 
though they had a choice whether to take the medication…Either you take it or you bleed to 
death.”6 Many HTC hematologists, reluctant to admit to themselves just how many of their 
patients had already contracted the virus, sugar-coated the results of the new ELISA test and told 
people with hemophilia and their families that a positive HIV test did not inevitably mean an 
eventual diagnosis of AIDS. As a result of their reticence, many community members who 
would later come to blame the factor companies for their AIDS did not even realize that they 
were infected during those early days. Hemophilia mother Elaine DePrince, for instance, was in 
1986 “reassured by my hematologist that an HIV-positive test result meant only that the virus 
had passed through a patients system and he had developed antibodies to it and, therefore, 
immunity.”7 Armed with that knowledge, she told a local TV anchor that “as a mother of sons 
with hemophilia, my greatest fear is that my children will be hit by a car. They stand a greater 
chance of dying in an accident than of AIDS.”8 Unbeknownst to her, all three of her boys with 
hemophilia had already contracted the virus, and all three would ultimately die of the disease that 
she confidently asserted her family had no reason to fear. 
  In 1986, people with hemophilia had many reasons to reject their status of AIDS victims. 
The lack of good information about the link between HIV and AIDS made it possible for 
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members of the hemophilia community to grasp onto a comforting possibility that they would 
survive the larger epidemic, and that innate bias towards believing in one’s self-preservation was 
certainly the most significant reason that so many people with hemophilia remained sanguine in 
the face of HIV. But the political context of the times also mattered to their calculus: in 1986 
many Americans still viewed AIDS as a “degenerate” disease, the sole province of sinners who 
had brought illness upon themselves through homosexual sex. HIV/AIDS historian Richard 
McKay argues that this tendency is not new, citing a broad array of past epidemics to 
demonstrate that religious right leaders like Jerry Falwell who named AIDS “a gay plague” and a 
“definite form of the judgment of God upon a society” acted in the tradition of a “long history 
underpinning the impulses to trace contagion, harbor suspicion, and lay blame in times of 
epidemic.”9 Although gay men were the primary targets of this reactionary ire, McKay argues 
that AIDS itself had become so intimately connected with ideas of complicity and degeneracy 
that other vulnerable groups who contracted the virus could be smeared by association. As social 
theorist Cindy Patton put it, once “perceptions of HIV risk were linked to social deviance, 
literally anyone or any category of people deemed epidemiologically significant could be 
converted into nominal queers.”10 Although many people with hemophilia still harbored 
homophobic attitudes or even blamed gay men for their infection during this time, they still 
acknowledged the bizarre ways that society conflated them with gay men. Reflecting on the 
response his AIDS diagnosis elicited in 1987, one person with hemophilia complained that 
“people just hate the gay people…that spills over to the rest of us who have AIDS, too. If you’re 
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dying with cancer, you’re a heroic person. If you have AIDS and you’re dying, even as a 
hemophiliac, you’re kind of the scum of the earth.”11 
  To make matters worse, the same ignorance that led people with hemophilia to reject the 
idea of an HIV-AIDS link also drove the broader American public into a fervor of AIDS 
paranoia that only made people with hemophilia more reluctant to disclose their diagnosis. Often 
referred to as “Afr-AIDS” by its critics, this fear of AIDS soon came to dominate discussions 
about political responses to the epidemic. In 1986, for instance, conservative firebrand William 
F. Buckley wrote an editorial in the New York Times titled “Crucial Steps in Combatting the 
AIDS Epidemic.” Buckley used his op-ed to fret that there was still no clear consensus on the 
transmissibility of AIDS, noting that “the moment has not yet come when men and women of 
science are unanimously agreed that AIDS cannot be casually communicated.”12 He went on to 
allow that “If the news [about transmission] is progressively reassuring, public identification 
would not be necessary” while also warning that “If it turns in the other direction and AIDS 
develops among, say, children who have merely roughhoused with other children who suffer 
from AIDS, then more drastic segregation measures would be called for.”13 In Buckley’s mind, 
even the most reassuring picture of AIDS’ virulence still called for drastic impositions on civil 
liberty; he called for the state to issue marriage licenses to people with HIV or AIDS “only after 
the intended spouse is advised that her intended husband has AIDS, and agrees to sterilization,” 
and wrote that even in the absence of public identification, people with AIDS should be forced to 
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submit to a private identification scheme in which “Everyone detected with AIDS should be 
tatooed (sic) in the upper forearm, to protect common-needle users, and on the buttocks, to 
prevent the victimization of other homosexuals.”14 Though these remarks were perhaps extreme 
in the reactionary discourse about AIDS, they serve to demonstrate just how terrified the broader 
public really was about the prospect of this “degenerate” disease spreading to other populations. 
  Generally, the hemophilia community was ill-prepared to face the stigma that an AIDS 
diagnosis provoked. Many families responded to the daunting prospect of an AIDS diagnosis by 
remaining in a “medical closet” of sorts, unwilling to admit their own infection to others or even 
to themselves. Elaine DePrince, for instance, refused to test her sons for HIV when her 
hematologist first broached the subject in 1986. Even though Elaine still held onto hope that a 
diagnosis of HIV did not inevitably lead to a diagnosis of AIDS, she also realized that even a 
recorded diagnosis of HIV could seriously harm her family. She remained firm on her 
commitment to not test until 1988, when she found a new hematologist for her children who 
“understood the possible discrimination we would encounter if the results of their HIV tests fell 
into the wrong hands.”15 Another person with hemophilia named David LePage recalled that 
when he was first diagnosed with HIV he “wasn’t afraid to tell anybody about HIV or its 
complications, so I told my landlord. They forced me out of the apartment. I found another 
apartment, and by then I had learned not to tell my landlord. I learned that honesty wasn’t the 
best policy.”16 These experiences of discrimination and backlash were relatively foreign to the 
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hemophilia community, and they kept many HIV-infected patients from speaking out about their 
experiences. 
  Not all hemophilia families shied away from acknowledging their AIDS status, however. 
Hemophilia father Bob Massie responded to Buckley’s editorial with his own furious letter to the 
editor, where he wrote that sterilization and forced tattooing were “Nazi idea(s) for keeping track 
of undesirables marked for destruction.”17 Massie concluded his letter by admitting his family’s 
connection to AIDS and rejecting all calls to discriminate against people like his son, writing: 
My son is a hemophiliac, one of the groups that, Mr. Buckley says coyly, is at ‘special 
risk.’ He goes on to announce that some AIDS carriers will die quickly, and others will 
live a normal life span. That is my understanding also. But there is another group of 
people who will not live out a normal life span: these are the people who will try to 
sterilize or tattoo my son or any other hemophiliac. I will see to that myself.18 
Although the limits of his solidarity only extended to the outer boundaries of the hemophilia 
community, Bob Massie’s letter serves as an early example of the militant approach to advocacy 
that would eventually characterize the hemophilia community’s revolutionary response to AIDS. 
  Massie’s militant approach to the world was necessary in large part because of the hatred 
and discrimination that HIV-infected people with hemophilia received from the broader public. 
The Ray family in Arcadia, Florida, for instance, quickly found themselves ostracized from their 
community once Louise Ray confided to her pastor that all three of her boys had contracted HIV 
through contaminated factor products in 1987. Her pastor responded by offering the family a 
one-time “love offering” and telling them to stay away from the Church; the school quickly 
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followed suit once it learned of the Ray boys’ infection, telling the family that their children 
were not welcome on school grounds before reluctantly offering to build a portable classroom on 
the blacktop for the three boys to study in complete quarantine.19 Undaunted by the fierce 
opposition, the Ray family took their case to court and ultimately won the right to send their 
children to school. Their time in Arcadia proved to be short-lived, however: the Rays’ neighbors 
responded with a massive school boycott and a campaign of anonymous harassment, which 
ultimately culminated in a still-unknown arsonist burning down the Rays’ home.20 Standing in 
front of the office of their lawyer in Sarasota the next morning after the attack, the boy’s father 
Clifford Ray told reporters that “Arcadia is no longer our home. They made that very clear to us 
last night.”21 Despite their best efforts, the Rays had been forced to leave the town that their 
children had called home for their entire lives. 
    Although the socio-political climate surrounding AIDS in America made it difficult for 
American people with hemophilia to reveal their infection or demand justice, the epidemic’s 
precise unfolding in other parts of the world gave other populations with hemophilia more 
opportunities for disclosure and advocacy. In Japan, for instance, people with hemophilia were 
some of the first people to contract HIV through their use of American-made clotting factor, and 
remained the largest at-risk groups for HIV throughout the first few years of the disease’s 
existence in their country.22 The fact that most Japanese people with HIV contracted the disease 
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through clotting factor changed the country’s perception of the condition, so Japanese people 
with hemophilia and HIV were afforded some space to speak out that was denied to their 
American counterparts. Japanese people with hemophilia were also quick to realize that they 
were sold American clotting factor long after those same products were banned in domestic 
markets, which sped up the anti-pharmaceutical backlash and provoked widespread sympathy. 
As a result of all these factors, Japanese people with hemophilia were some of the first recipients 
of contaminated blood products to openly accuse the manufacturers of wrongdoing. One 
anonymous Japanese person with hemophilia interviewed about his AIDS status in 1986 told the 
Washington Post that “I cannot forgive that they (American factor companies) continued selling 
to Japanese people what had been forbidden to sell to Americans… I think they are very 
responsible for the spread of AIDS throughout the world, including to me.”23  
  Institutional hemophilia organizations also stepped forward to fight for justice and 
compensation in Japan. Yukio Yasuda, the head of the Japan Hemophilia Society, told reporters 
in the same article that over-reliance on American blood products had turned Japan into “the 
vampire of the world.”24 Yasuda bitterly noted that “For American exporters, it (the sale of 
factor products) is a very profitable business,” before predicting that “As the number of victims 
begins to grow, so too will the anger.”25 Yasuda’s prediction ultimately proved prescient; as the 
infection toll mounted it became clear that over 2,000 people with hemophilia had been infected 
with contaminated product, many of them at the hands of a government-owned pharmaceutical 
company that the Japanese hemophilia community accused of delaying the sale of international 
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heat-treated product until they could develop their own domestic alternative.26 That revelation 
ensured that the story of contaminated factor reverberated outwards past the boundaries of the 
small hemophilia community in Japan, quickly becoming what legal historian Richard Feldman 
calls “one of the most volatile medical and political scandals of the postwar era.”27 
  Yasuda’s prediction that further infections would provoke outrage also came to pass in 
America. By 1988, NHF realized that over 60% of America’s 20,000 people with hemophilia 
had contracted HIV. Cognizant of the need for clear communication on the risk of HIV and 
AIDS, NHF began to draw up a “White Paper” on hemophilia and HIV. The NHF White Paper 
openly acknowledged the extent of infection in the hemophilia community, and even broached 
difficult topics like safe sex that NHF had previously ignored. Despite the importance of these 
subjects, NHF’s national board and local state chapters collectively voted not to release the 
White Paper. Recalling discussions over this decision in 1988, one NHF insider said that “the 
chapters just got up in arms and said, ‘you can’t do this; we have people living in this 
community. If they’re exposed, their house could be destroyed, this will happen, they’ll be 
kicked out of school.’”28 Despite serious pushback, NHF made some minor concessions to those 
who thought HIV/AIDS should be taken more seriously. The most important of these 
concessions was the creation of the Chapter Outreach Demonstration Project (CODP), which 
was designed to educate people with hemophilia who were involved in their chapters but did not 
receive access to treatment at a local HTC where the local hematology team could offer guidance 
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on AIDS.29 Many community members, however, were still dissatisfied with this token gesture. 
Small groups of these disaffected critics had already taken advantage of NHF’s annual 
symposium to create peer education networks that discussed topics that NHF would not, such as 
the risk of HIV/AIDS for the wives of men with hemophilia, or the experiences of POC with 
hemophilia and AIDS.30 Leaders of these networks demanded that these difficult topics be given 
more airtime at the 1989 meeting, where tensions threatened to boil over. NHF responded by 
creating the Women’s Outreach Network of NHF (WONN) and the Men’s Advocacy Network of 
NHF (MANN), which respectively gave the preexisting leadership of these already-existing 
networks resources like access to paid social scientists and health educators.31 
  Some community members, however, gave up on NHF entirely. The lack of any clear 
guidance or good information about AIDS from NHF or the local HTCs in those early years had 
created an information vacuum, and the most disaffected people with hemophilia looked further 
afield than local communities to learn how to combat the virus. Bemoaning the community’s 
poor response to HIV in 1991, one anonymous man with hemophilia told the New York Times 
that he learned of his infection in 1985 but received no helpful guidance on how to respond to it. 
Paraphrasing the frustrated source’s remarks, the Times wrote that 
His doctors, he said, ‘never enforced any kind of fear, let alone information.’ He said he 
was never counseled about safe sex, even though he had unprotected sexual intercourse 
with his girlfriend for three years, with his doctors’ knowledge. His girlfriend, he said, 
was not infected. The man said that when he finally became ill he got no information, 
advice, or support from his hematologist. He said he finally learned about his options 
from a group of gay men.32 
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  Indeed, gay men were crucial to the formation of an organized hemophilia protest 
movement. During the early years of contaminated factor, people with hemophilia had gone to 
war with gay men over the question of deferring gay plasma donors to protect the factor supply. 
Some of this old animosity still lingered in the early 90s, but by this time people with hemophilia 
who aimed to take a more aggressive posture on AIDS realized that they had much to learn from 
the gay community. They reached out to gay men’s organizations for guidance, and came away 
from the experience with new tools and perspectives to confront the AIDS crisis. Michael 
Rosenberg, who founded the hugely influential Hemophilia/HIV Peer Association (H/HIV PA) 
in California, told reporters when he contracted AIDS and his brother died of it, he “ended up 
going to gay men for advice and support.”33 Jonathan Wadleigh, who founded the equally 
important Committee of Ten Thousand (COTT) around the same time, futilely attempted to 
convince his local NHF chapter to confront the deadly virus before attending meetings of ACT 
UP/Boston to learn the organizing tactics he ultimately used to launch COTT.34 The 
organizations that these two men created became the respective faces of hemophilia activism on 
the East and West coasts during the 90s, and together they would launch a revolution against the 
established powers of hemophilia that would shake the community to its roots. 
   Despite the importance of these organizations within the community, these early 
hemophilia AIDS activists still labored in the shadow of the much larger and more visible gay 
rights movement for AIDS justice in the eyes of the broader public. As an anonymous man with 
hemophilia noted in his interview with the Boston Globe back in 1987, hatred for the gay 
community “spilled over” onto the hemophilia community through the common link of an AIDS 
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diagnosis. This association presented hemophilia advocates with a dilemma: should they bolster 
their ranks by standing in solidarity with gay men, or work to elicit sympathy by separating 
themselves from them? Organizers responded to this dilemma with different tactics throughout 
the late 80s and early 90s, sometimes choosing to find common cause with gay men and 
sometimes separating from them by portraying themselves as uniquely “innocent” victims. They 
never totally committed to one strategy or another, instead maintaining an uneasy alliance with 
gay rights groups during this critical period. 
  On one hand, these early hemophilia activists knew that they owed the gay community a 
great deal for blazing a trail for AIDS activists and dealing with the brunt of a homophobic 
society’s hatred for AIDS victims. Wadleigh, Rosenberg, and countless other early hemophilia 
activists learned how to make their voices heard during the time they spent in mostly gay activist 
organizations and spaces, and they were in no rush to stab their fellow travelers in the back. 
Hemophilia activist and COTT board member Greg Haas acknowledged the debt that people 
with hemophilia owed gay men in the 1992 issue 1 of COTT’s newsletter The Common Factor, 
writing that “for years the gay community has led the fight, gaining expanded access to 
treatments, demanding study of immunomodulators, investigating alternative therapies, forcing 
down astronomical drug prices, making treatment and prophylaxis of opportunistic infections a 
priority.”35 He called for people with hemophilia to involve themselves in the larger struggle for 
AIDS justice, arguing that  
This is our fight, too! It is far past time for us to participate in the struggles that extend 
beyond our own particular community. That is why the COTT is an HIV advocacy 
organization in the hemophilia community, instead of a hemophilia organization that lists 
AIDS among its many concerns. COTT is actively building alliances across the entire 
spectrum of communities affected by AIDS… We are fighting for our health and our 
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lives. And the lives of our brothers and sisters in the gay community, inner cities, and 
everywhere else this virus replicates.36 
Haas’s call to action is significant because it rebukes those people with hemophilia who thought 
of themselves as uniquely undeserving victims of AIDS. Haas believed that so long as HIV-
infected people with hemophilia thought of themselves “victims,” actual change would be 
stymied. He reminded readers that because the virus did not have a morality, concepts such as 
innocence/guilt were useless. Haas ended his manifesto on this point, rejecting hemophilia 
victimhood politics and calling for solidarity with “all of the communities affected by this damn 
virus.”37 
  But even as organizers like Haas called for people with hemophilia to add their voice to a 
common chorus of AIDS activists, other activists in the community believed that much of what 
they had to say would be drowned out in the crowd. They pointed out that like it or not, people 
with hemophilia had not contracted HIV in the same way as the gay activists who come before 
them. They had been infected by a greedy pharmaceutical industry that put profits ahead of 
human lives, and as a result they had grievances and demands that were different from those of 
the larger movement for AIDS justice. Michael Rosenberg articulated this view in his landmark 
1992 call to arms “Causes and Effects of the Hemophilia/HIV Epidemic,” writing that people 
with hemophilia were experiencing a “genocide” at the hands of greedy businessmen who 
developed unsafe therapies and a corrupt FDA that enabled them. Rosenberg asserted that the 
hemophilia community was in fact unique in its experience of AIDS, stressing the fact that “The 
hemophilia population is the only AIDS risk group that became HIV-infected because we 
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consumed products sold at a profit by major corporations.”38 From there, he went further and 
threw gay men under the bus in order to draw further distinctions between people with 
hemophilia and other AIDS-affected groups, noting that “with the exception of persons who 
were transfused with contaminated blood, only our community has been brought down by AIDS 
precisely because we followed the advice of our doctors.”39 Rosenberg’s thinly-veiled insult to 
the gay community demonstrated the worst instincts in hemophilia advocacy, but it also 
represented the fundamental dilemma facing would-be activists. If the causes of the injury that 
people with hemophilia experienced were unique, so too then were the remedies for that injury. 
If people with hemophilia wanted to receive specific and meaningful justice, then solidarity 
could only go so far. 
The “Hemophilia Revolution” Begins 
 Whatever we think of their tactics and rhetoric today, COTT and H/HIV PA had no 
difficulty finding an audience. The hemophilia community had long been close-knit, even before 
the AIDS crisis. Reflecting on her time working with people with hemophilia, Sharon Barrett of 
the MCH remembered that “if you shared a thought with one person in the hemophilia 
community, it was across the country in seconds.”40 As COTT and H/HIV PA rose to 
prominence, they took advantage of these long-standing networks in order to get the word out. 
The first issue of H/HIV’s Action Now! newsletter, for instance, was sent to a list of “500 
families nationwide,” which the editors explained that they created by drawing upon “other lists 
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that were created for the purpose, explicit or implicit, of allowing persons with hemophilia to 
connect with each other.”41 These lists proved incredibly effective, and by the end of 1992 
COTT and H/HIV PA were both major players in the world of hemophilia. 
  COTT and the H/HIV Peer Association arrived on the scene just as larger trends in 
hemophilia had begun to awaken patients to the reality of their situation. In Canada and France, 
for instance, federal governments had already paid out large sums of money to HIV-infected 
people with hemophilia and their surviving families. Rosenberg drew attention to this disparity in 
the first issue of Action Now! and questioned why NHF was not doing more to help, writing 
“practically every country in the industrialized world has adopted a financial assistance program 
for the people caught up by the H/HIV epidemic.... of course, I question why nothing has been 
done in the U.S.? But, even more, I want to know why our hemophilia organizations have not 
taken up this cause?”42 To make matters worse, people with hemophilia began to learn more 
about the industry and government decisions that produced their infection even as these 
international settlements piled up. The steady drip of lawsuits slowly unearthed new insights 
about backroom politics in the factor industry through the legal process of discovery, and certain 
reporters who followed the tainted factor crisis gradually found more and more whistleblowers 
who were willing to come forward about their time in the factor industry or the regulatory 
agencies. All these revelations were blasted out to the community through Action Now! and The 
Common Factor, which in turn only attracted more members of the community to subscribe to 
these newsletters. COTT, for instance, lionized Dr. Francis as a hero of the community, noting 
from leaked memos that even in January of 1983 Francis “warned of ‘post-factor VIII receipt of 
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AIDS,’ lamenting that ‘one-third to one-half of [persons with hemophilia] might already be 
exposed.’“43 These revelations shattered the community’s previous understanding of its 
infection, and almost instantly transformed AIDS discourse within the hemophilia community. 
  Once these stories convinced less engaged people with hemophilia that the factor 
companies’ explanation for their experience of AIDS was nothing more than a self-serving lie, 
they quickly began to rebel against the previous authorities in hemophilia care who backed that 
narrative. Loras Goedken, a Texas-borne person with hemophilia who had already lost seven 
family members to AIDS and was dying of it himself, told reporters at the Newport Daily News 
that “for the longest time I got up angry and went to bed angry. I was angry at gays, at drug 
users. Then I learned more about what the drug companies did and realized that’s who I should 
be angry at. All these lives gone for the sake of the bottom line.”44 Representatives of the factor 
industry pushed back against these allegations, of course: reporters from the Daily News 
interviewed Miles Pharmaceutical’s director of corporate communications Don Hyman in the 
same article, dutifully publishing his response that “In a situation like this, it’s natural that the 
aggrieved want to look for the villain and punish him… but the villain in this case is not a 
company or a person. It’s the HIV virus.”45 Unsatisfied with these excuses, however, people with 
hemophilia continued to sue for compensation and push for justice. 
  Tensions boiled over at the 1992 NHF annual meeting in Atlanta. Recalling the 
pandemonium of that meeting, Laurie Kelley explained that  
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This was at the height of tensions between the consumer advocacy groups and 
pharmaceutical companies, during the HIV crisis. One group of activists even dressed as 
grim reapers, poured red paint on themselves to represent spilled blood, and walked 
among the booths at the exhibit hall, banging a drum. It was chilling, and everyone was 
on edge. Many pharma reps left, especially after they had received death threats. The 
exhibit hall became deserted.46  
Even amidst the chaos, however, community members who hoped to rehabilitate NHF worked to 
toe a line between the radical activists and the conservative NHF leadership. Val Bias, a MANN 
leader, and Glenn Pierce, a person with hemophilia who was also a physician, both ran for NHF 
president in 1992 on a platform of reforming the organization to meet the community’s demands. 
Fearing that they would steal votes from one another, the two agreed that Bias would drop out so 
that Pierce could run on a reform platform unopposed and then appoint Bias chairman of the 
board once elected.47 Writing in the aftermath of the election, Pierce told the community that “in 
reviewing the past year it is clear that the NHF ship needs to be turned—and not just five or ten 
degrees, but 45 degrees.”48 He and Val quickly set about righting the ship, implementing new 
community outreach programs to reach underserved populations, broaching previously 
undiscussed topics like safe sex, and honoring activist demands like the call to ban NHF 
employees from testifying against community members who sued factor companies.49  
  Despite these moves, the COTT and H/HIV PA set still took issue with NHF’s reforms. 
Reflecting back on this era, Pierce recalls that protesters “demanded our accountability, and it 
was very difficult to have the weight of the past fifteen years of NHF actions upon our 
shoulders… though we weren’t the people making the decisions fifteen years ago, we were the 
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people running the organizations, [and they saw us as] responsible for making those decisions.”50 
NHF might have begun to turn 45 degrees, but COTT and H/HIV PA called for a complete 180. 
Much of COTT and H/HIV PA’s grievance with NHF revolved around the national 
organization’s tepid response to calls for litigation and compensation. COTT and H/HIV PA 
favored aggressive lawsuits and petitions for government payouts, while NHF adopted a more 
cautious approach. NHF insisted that they opposed such calls because they would only create 
distinctions between AIDS victims, calling them “an ideological throwback to Elizabethan Poor 
Laws, with notions of deserved and undeserved populations.”51 COTT and H/HIV PA, by 
contrast, argued that NHF was merely continuing in its long history of carrying water for the 
pharmaceutical industry by blocking community demands for justice. Despite some limited 
collaboration and extensive listening sessions, NHF representatives left the 1992 meeting unable 
to find common ground with COTT and H/HIV PA. 
  Debates about compensation flared up again at the NHF annual meeting of 1993, where 
activists once again showed up in force to protest the national organization’s leadership. NHF 
announced that their special committee examining compensation, the SAC, had come up with a 
payout scheme for the factor companies. Under this scheme the factor companies would pay 
$125,000 dollars for each HIV-infected person with hemophilia, with most of that money going 
to an NHF-managed fund that would fund community-wide programming and payout petitions 
for individual assistance based on perceived merit.52 Unsurprisingly, this proposal outraged 
everyone present. The factor companies refused to pay the 1.5 billion dollars that NHF’s scheme 
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would entail, calling the price too steep considering the diligence they had used to protect the 
blood supply. The activists, on the other hand, said the amount was too low, and furthermore 
blamed NHF for creating a payout scheme that came with no admission of wrongdoing and 
funneled most of the money into NHF’s own coffers rather than the hands of individual families. 
COTT’s VP Corey Dubin wrote that NHF’s compensation program was “conceptually and 
practically a reactive strategy designed ultimately to defend the status quo… NHF’s relationship 
to the industry, then and now, illuminates the why of their response to AIDS.”53 H/HIV PA, for 
their part, came away from the meeting promising to add NHF to the list of defendants for their 
class action lawsuit. 
  COTT and H/HIV PA were set on pursuing an aggressive legal strategy in 1993 because 
they felt confident that courts would take their side. Although almost all the lawsuits prior to 
1993 had ended in failure, COTT and H/HIV PA believed that a Boston lawyer named Eric 
Weinberg had discovered a new legal theory that could finally extract compensation from the 
factor companies. By 1993, Weinberg had unsuccessfully litigated several cases for HIV-
infected people with hemophilia. During those cases, he noticed two main difficulties: blood 
shield laws made it incredibly difficult for people with hemophilia to hold factor companies 
liable for the sale of contaminated factor, and people with hemophilia had to prove that they 
were infected after the factor companies realized the dangers of HIV in order to bring charges 
asserting that the factor companies failed to advise patients of the risks.54 Weinberg proposed to 
bypass both of those issues by bringing a lawsuit alleging that the factor companies had failed in 
their duty of care rather than their duty to warn, arguing that these corporations had the means to 
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protect the factor supply from viruses and the information to realize such protection was 
necessary decades earlier.55 While developing evidence for this line of thinking he met 
Rosenberg, who gave Weinberg papers that documented how major factor companies turned 
down the Berwingwerke patent for heat-treated factor in 1978.56 He also found a 1976 report 
about the risks of paid donor plasma called Unsolved Therapeutic Problems in Hemophilia, 
written in part by an FDA doctor who had since taken to testifying for the factor companies that 
AIDS was an unforeseeable catastrophe.57 Armed with this evidence, Weinberg felt that he could 
successfully litigate a settlement on behalf of HIV-infected people with hemophilia and their 
families. 
  But who would ultimately benefit from this legal theory? This question of litigants was a 
contentious one; some lawyers and community members preferred to pursue individual cases on 
their individual merits, while others favored the idea of a class action lawsuit, and still others 
favored pursuing one or the other before negotiating a settlement. Lawyers who had worked 
separately for individual families joined forces into a Steering Committee to pursue a unified 
legal strategy in 1993, but these differences of opinion quickly caused rifts within the team.58 
Wary of the possibility that influential members of the Steering Committee might prefer a 
settlement that would undermine his cases in New Jersey, Weinberg approached COTT in 1994 
and told them to form a Community Advisory Committee that could keep tab on the lawyers and 
prevent them from adopting a strategy that maximized fees and minimized payouts for 
 
55 Eric Weinberg and Donna Shaw, Blood on Their Hands: How Greedy Companies, Inept Bureaucracy, and Bad 
Science Killed Thousands of Hemophiliacs (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2017), 63. 
56 Eric Weinberg and Donna Shaw, Blood on Their Hands, 54. 
57 Eric Weinberg and Donna Shaw, Blood on Their Hands, 55. 
58 Eric Weinberg and Donna Shaw, Blood on Their Hands, 154.  
Hubbert 58 
 
community members.59 These disagreements about the best legal path forwards only continued 
as 1994 and 1995 dragged on, culminating in a vicious flurry of suits and countersuits between 
the various lawyers, plaintiffs, and activists involved in the project. 
  Despite their new tactics, hemophilia activists experienced significant setbacks in their 
legal fight to extract compensation from the factor companies. Chicago judge John Grady 
certified that people with hemophilia had a valid class action case in his 1994 ruling on Wadleigh 
v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., but the Seventh Court of Appeals overturned that ruling later that 
year. Writing on behalf of the Court, Judge Posner argued that a class action lawsuit presented an 
undue burden for the factor companies. He argued that if each case was adjudicated separately 
the factor companies would likely win the bulk of them, writing that “the defendants have won 
twelve of the first thirteen, and, if this is a representative sample, they are likely to win most of 
the remaining ones [individual cases] as well.”60 If these cases were packaged together, however, 
Posner believed the cumulative damages would be so large that the defendants could easily be 
facing “$25 billion in potential liability (conceivably more), and with it bankruptcy,” which 
would put them “under intense pressure to settle.”61 Citing another judge’s conclusion that 
“settlements induced by a small probability of an immense judgment in a class action” were 
essentially “blackmail lawsuits,” Posner decertified the class.62  
  Undeterred by this setback, hemophilia activists still pushed onwards with individual 
lawsuits and even pressured their lawyers to appeal the ruling to the Supreme Court. The former 
approach proved more successful than the latter; several community members received sizable 
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settlements after the Posner ruling based on the steady drip of damning facts about the factor 
industry, but the Supreme Court summarily dismissed the idea of a class action suit without 
comment. As the lawsuits continued, VP of COTT Corey Dubin went behind the back of 
Wadleigh and his more stubborn peers in 1996 to negotiate a secret settlement package with the 
major factor corporations. Under Dubin’s settlement scheme, the factor companies would offer 
$100,000 dollars for each HIV-infected person with hemophilia. Taking the money would 
preclude them or their surviving relatives from suing the factor companies for further damages, 
and the factor companies would only pay out these funds if fewer than 100 families chose to opt 
out.63 Reflecting on his negotiations with the manufacturers, Dubin told the New York Times that 
“I told him [President of Baxter International John Bacich] they were going to have to live with 
us as customers when all the high-powered litigators were gone… If you buy a Pinto from Ford 
that blows up, you can tell Ford to go to hell. But I don’t have that luxury.”64 As hemophilia 
activists experienced disappointment after disappointment, they gradually pulled back the 
horizons of their ambitions. 
   Even as they experienced setbacks in the court system, however, people with hemophilia 
saw more success pressuring their congressmen and senators to investigate the tainted factor 
epidemic and find a legislative remedy. Their demands for action culminated in Senator Edward 
Kennedy, Senator Bob Graham, and Congressman Porter Goss charging Donna Shalala of 
DHHS with the responsibility of producing an exploratory committee that would investigate the 
 
63 Weinberg and Shaw, Blood on Their Hands, 218. 
64 Barry Meier, “Blood, Money and AIDS: Hemophiliacs Are Split; Liability Cases Bogged Down in Disputes,” 




tainted factor crisis.65 Shalala handed this task down to the IOM, commissioning them to write a 
retrospective report on the hemophilia HIV crisis. When the IOM task force opened for public 
comment in late 1994, hemophilia community members from around the country came to 
Washington to make their voices heard. They called for an honest account of the AIDS epidemic, 
compensation for its victims, and punishment for its architects. Even as factor companies sent 
professional representatives to the hill to explain away the gruesome side effects of their 
products, the community crowded the National Academy of Science’s boardroom with throngs 
of outraged widows and dying children in order to shame their critics into silence and speak truth 
to power. 
  Jonathon Wadleigh of COTT was the first community member to testify before the 
committee, and his remarks set the tone for the meeting. Wadleigh called what had happened to 
the hemophilia community a “genocide,” and told the committee that the entire community was 
relying on them to uncover the truth.66 He argued that the plague that had fallen over the 
hemophilia community was caused by greedy factor companies and complicit government 
agencies rather than an unforeseeable virus, proclaiming that  
The dangers of viral contamination of antihemophilic factor were well known many years 
prior to the AIDS epidemic yet nothing was done. Profit concerns prevailed over product 
safety concerns and the government agencies responsible for ensuring product safety had 
a long and cozy history with the blood industry, both for profit and not for profit.67 
From there, Wadleigh went on to assert that these crimes had not yet been brought to light only 
thanks to the concerted efforts of institutional actors who were implicated in them. He singled 
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out former director of NHF Alan Brownstein as one actor worthy of special blame, claiming that 
Brownstein told a previous congressional committee on HIV and blood safety that “there was not 
a problem or any outstanding questions related to the hemophilia community or the 
contamination of AHF.”68 Wadleigh believed that by “covering up the culpability of NHF and 
doing the bidding of his long term friends in industry, Brownstein successfully convinced the 
Dingell committee to exclude the anti-hemophilic factor products from their investigations.”69  
  Now, four years removed from these investigations, Wadleigh told the IOM committee 
that they had a chance to set things right. He expressed skepticism in their good faith desire to do 
so, however, noting that HHS’s inspector general should have handled this instead of IOM 
because there was “little disagreement as to the scientific facts here. The issues at hand involve 
ethical and policy questions related to conflict of interest in decision making.”70 Wadleigh then 
went on to attack the IOM committee for not reaching out to COTT for assistance, and even 
questioned the very idea that factor was necessary in the first place when cryoprecipitate 
existed.71 He expounded on these topics at length, ignoring two separate complaints from the 
facilitator that he had gone over time before finally sitting down to enthusiastic applause from 
other community members in the audience.72 
   Wadleigh was followed by a long litany of activists and community members, all of 
whom reiterated the central point that what had happened to them could have been prevented. 
Some of the speakers thanked the committee for their time, and offered up documents that they 
had acquired through their family’s litigation against factor companies; others darkly proclaimed 
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that they had little faith in the committee itself, and named them complicit in the cover-up. 
Perhaps the most memorable explanation for the tainted factor crisis came from Petra Jason, 
whose son with hemophilia died of AIDS 2 years before the IOM investigation. Sobbing as she 
spoke, Jason told the committee that “I bought that blood product, I paid for that blood product 
and I made my child take that product. I murdered my child but ladies and gentlemen of the 
commission, I did not do this alone. The drug and blood industry knew the gun was loaded and 
they let me shoot.”73  
  Although the community did everything its power to make its voice heard during the 
IOM committee’s open sessions, the bleeding edge of hemophilia activism was simply too 
transgressive to be incorporated into the IOM report, which was finally published in 1995. The 
IOM committee was never going to echo radicals like Wadleigh, who described the community’s 
experiences as a “genocide of persons with hemophilia, the worst medical induced disaster in the 
history of mankind.”74 Nor were they likely to accept the radical activists’ proposed remedies for 
that crime, which according to Corey Dubin called for nothing less than the “the immediate 
elimination of profit from any aspect of health care, including blood products.”75 Instead of 
adopting these expansive critiques, the committee took a far more conservative approach. They 
infamously did not assign blame to specific actors (as discussed in the introduction to chapter 1), 
and often attributed goodwill to factor companies and government actors to explain away lapses 
in judgement that hemophilia activists described as the products of corruption and greed. If 
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members of the hemophilia community expected that the report would provide them total 
vindication, then they were surely disappointed by its cautious findings.  
  Despite these disappointments, however, the IOM report was not a total defeat for the 
hemophilia community. The IOM report did point out holistic failures in the regulation of the 
blood supply, and recommended sweeping reforms to prevent future catastrophes. It signed onto 
COTT and H/HIV PA’s central critique that the hemophilia AIDS epidemic could have been 
prevented, for instance, writing that “heat treatment processes to prevent the transmission of 
hepatitis could have been developed before 1980, an advance that would have prevented many 
cases of AIDS in individuals with hemophilia... strong incentives to maintain the status quo, and 
a weak countervailing force concerned with blood product safety, combined to inhibit rapid 
development of heat-treated products.”76 It also called for compensation to HIV-infected people 
with hemophilia and their families, writing that “The federal government should consider 
establishing a no-fault compensation system for individuals who suffer adverse consequences 
from the use of blood or blood products.”77 Finally, the report recommended sweeping changes 
to the regulation of blood products, incorporating several suggestions from the community that 
eventually became durable pieces of law and regulation. COTT’s request for a lookback system 
that periodically re-examined the risk of previously approved medicines in light of new science 
and technology was granted, as was their request for community input on BPAC.78 Even if the 
report was not as explicit in its critiques, conclusions, and prescriptions as some activists would 
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have preferred, it still vindicated many of the community’s most important grievances and 
demands. 
  Inspired by the IOM report, in 1995 Congress took up the question of compensation. 
Named after the youngest child in the Ray family, who died of AIDS in 1992, the Ricky Ray 
Hemophilia Relief Fund Act originally offered HIV-infected people with hemophilia or their 
surviving families a one-time payment of $125,000 dollars (which was later negotiated down to 
$100,000). In a Findings preface to the bill that was cut in the final wording, its authors wrote 
that this compassionate payout was necessary because “the Federal Government failed to fulfill 
its responsibility to properly regulate the blood-products industry, and thus exposed individuals 
with blood clotting disorders, such as hemophilia, and their families to potential infection with a 
fatal disease.”79 Ricky Ray, then, was not a wholesale vindication of the larger movement of 
AIDS justice, which argued that all people who contracted AIDS were victims of neglectful 
government. But because the bill’s aims were so limited, it was able to attract support from 
legislators would have withheld their vote for a more radical response to AIDS. When the Ricky 
Ray Act passed in 1998, it did so with a decisive majority of Republicans voting in favor. 
Reflecting on the bill’s triumph in 2016, NHF’s then-CEO Val Bias explained that  
The argument we made to Congress was that hemophilia is largely a male disease passed 
from mother to son on the X chromosome, so when these men die, they were the head of 
their household. They couldn’t get life insurance anyways with hemophilia, so when they 
died their family really was financially impacted, not only then but for generations…. and 
in a Republican House and Congress, that sold.80  
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This heteronormative vision of a man at the head of the household providing for his wife and 
kids after death conspicuously excluded gay men, who also supported friends and family who 
would be harmed by their deaths. But by Bias’s own admission this more limited appeal spoke to 
Republicans, and as a result the Ricky Ray Hemophilia Act sailed through Congress. 
 Hemophilia activists had broken ranks with their allies to win their own compensation, 
and they paid a political price for that decision. The AIDS Action Council, then the largest AIDS 
activism organization in the country, did not back the Ricky Ray Act and instead maintained a 
policy of neutrality.81 Other onlookers were even more contemptuous. Gay activist John Hannah 
sarcastically laid out the difficult dilemma facing intolerant Republicans in a local Vermont 
LBGT paper, writing “how can something be done about AIDS without having to admit that 
you’ve helped faggots, drug-addicts and blacks? What’s a modern-day bigot to do? Answer: the 
Ricky Ray Hemophilia Act.”82 Hannah then clarified his position on people with hemophilia, 
writing “I have nothing whatsoever against hemophiliacs. They are indeed innocent victims of 
AIDS. What I take strong exception to is the notion, implicit in this legislation, that other groups 
afflicted by AIDS are in some way ‘less innocent.’“83 He went on condemn hemophilia groups 
that supported such legislation, arguing that they had turned their backs on their allies. Like Greg 
Haas in the pages of COTT’s first issue of Common Factor six years earlier, Hannah expected 
more solidarity from the hemophilia community, and rejected calls to separate people with AIDS 
into the categories of “deserving victims” and “undeserving victims.” 
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  After the Dubin settlement and the Ricky Ray Hemophilia Act, the radical hemophilia 
justice movement gradually lost its momentum. Historian David Kirp argues that aggressive 
organizations like COTT and H/HIV PA rarely adopt political goals conducive to long term 
survival, noting that “groups like ACT-UP, which nurture themselves on a diet of high-pitched 
outrage, implode because they can’t sustain the requisite level of fury.”84 This dismissive 
explanation may be too simplistic, however. COTT and H/HIV PA were organizations 
comprised of dying people with hemophilia, who knew that they only had a few years to extract 
justice. Even as these organizations won concessions like the Ricky Ray act or the Dubin 
settlement, they also lost key leaders to the deadly AIDS virus. On the “board spiritual” section 
of COTT’s website that lists key community leaders who have since passed away, COTT notes 
that they “survived the loss of nearly 60 percent of its Board of Directors during the height of the 
AIDS/blood epidemic during the mid 1990s.”85 Though COTT has managed to survive in a more 
modest form even through these losses, H/HIV PA proved more ephemeral: Michael Rosenberg 
died in 1992, and the organization fell apart not long after his demise.86 Perhaps most 
importantly of all, however, even the most radical people with hemophilia still relied on the 
people who had killed them for the clotting factor that kept them alive. As Dubin noted when he 
put aside his hopes for complete vindication, people with hemophilia would need to learn to live 
with these organizations, because living without their product was impossible. All that the 
community could do now was look towards the future, and guard against further abuses from the 
pharmaceutical industry. 
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For a time, it seemed like very little would come from the mishandling of tainted factor in 
the early 80s. People with hemophilia accepted the industry’s rationales for their infection for a 
time, genuinely believing that HIV-contaminated factor was the result of an unforeseeable 
tragedy rather than a preventable betrayal. Discontented activists operating on the outskirts of the 
community eventually pushed back on these excuses, however, and followed in the footsteps of 
gay men by launching a protest movement that fought for justice, recognition, and compensation. 
They succeeded in attaining some of their goals but fell short of others, constantly walking a 
tightrope between solidarity and solitude as they sought to attain their own relief without turning 
their backs on other AIDS-infected populations. The hemophilia community ultimately broke 
ranks with its comrades to win recognition and compensation from the pharmaceutical industry 
and the American government, putting aside the most radical planks of its political platform to 
achieve the possible. This decision to compromise left larger questions of justice and complicity 
for people with hemophilia specifically and AIDS victims more generally unanswered, however, 
and as a result the legacy of the tainted factor crisis is still contested to this day. In the final 
chapter we will examine the various meanings of the tainted factor crisis and its resolution from 






  Even as the tides of hemophilia activism receded and HIV-infected people with 
hemophilia faded in the public consciousness, disaffected members of the hemophilia 
community realized that their larger demands for justice and accountability had only been half-
met. Like-minded people with hemophilia began to congregate in new virtual spaces, where they 
discussed the still-incomplete work of hemophilia activism and worried about how society would 
remember their pain and loss after they were gone. Writing on one such since-deleted forum in 
late 1996, an anonymous and anxious person with hemophilia wondered “Hi all and what can we 
do?... I am speaking about the need to become seen by the mainstream population. Without 
resorting to violence, what can we do to once again become a discussion in the press... to be seen 
not as troublemakers but as people who will Not Go Away?”1 The forum user went on to explore 
several possible courses of action, tentatively suggesting tactics such as “some kind of factor 
strike? A long-term occupation or sit-down of some sort?”2 before conceding such responses 
were unlikely. They concluded their post on a note that was both optimistic and cautious, writing 
“Hang in there fellow screw-ees. We shall not be screwed again (I hope not, anyway).”3 
 Although this forum post is a minor footnote in the larger history of hemophilia and HIV, 
the questions it poses are worth considering because they perfectly illustrate the larger dilemmas 
and concerns facing the hemophilia community at the turn of the 21st century. Despite the best 
 
1 David Kirp, “The Politics of Blood: Hemophilia Activism in the AIDS Crisis,” in Blood Feuds: AIDS, Blood, and 
the Politics of Medical Disaster, eds. Eric Feldman and Ronald Bayer (Cary: Oxford University Press, 1999), 311. 
2 David Kirp, “The Politics of Blood,” 311. 
3 David Kirp, “The Politics of Blood,” 311. 
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efforts of hemophilia activists, who shouted out their grievances from the rooftops and rallied 
around ACTUP slogans like “Silence=Death,” the tainted factor crisis never made a durable 
impact in the American consciousness. The cursory attention that people with hemophilia did 
attract as a largely “respectable” population that was nevertheless decimated by AIDS quickly 
dissipated after the Ryan White and Ricky Ray acts, which the broader American public saw 
collectively as “justice” for their community. But even as the world lost interest in people with 
hemophilia, the AIDS epidemic continued to ravage their community. To make matters worse, 
many of the essential “blind spots” in American medicine that enabled the infection of people 
with hemophilia back in 1982 had still been left unaddressed in 1996. Despite all their successes, 
radical institutions like COTT and H/HIV PA never fully realized their aspirations to transform 
the entire landscape of American medicine. 
  Perhaps inspired by these failures, during the late 90s important leaders and organizations 
in the world of hemophilia began to advocate for people with bleeding disorders using more 
moderate rhetoric and tactics. These reformers believed that if people with hemophilia wanted to 
ensure that their “fellow screw-ees” would never be screwed again, they would have to transition 
from a short-term politics that aimed to produce outrage and spark revolution to a long-term 
politics that aimed to generate memory and guide reformation. They argued that whether they 
liked it or not, people with hemophilia could not remain in a state of permanent warfare with all 
the various institutions had so badly failed them so badly during the 80s. To win a seat at the 
table they would need to bury the hatchet, relinquishing some control over their community’s 
painful history to generate a new political vision for the future. People with hemophilia thus 
generated accounts of their community’s history in conversation with other stakeholders 
implicated in the story of tainted factor, never willing to totally cede control of the 
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historiography, yet also painfully aware that guarding against further abuses would require 
institutional cooperation.  
  Although these tactics have gained the hemophilia community some measure of influence 
and sway, they have also partially hidden the ways that the current institutional powers in the 
world of hemophilia resemble the bad-faith actors that came before. Many histories of 
hemophilia and AIDS uphold that ideological project by ending with the passage of the Ricky 
Ray and Ryan White Acts, using those landmark pieces of legislation to delineate the “end of an 
era” and labeling everything that came afterwards a “bright new future” for the community. But 
just as a chronological demarcation between the “golden years” and the “years of AIDS” 
conceals more than it reveals, so too does this false periodization obfuscate the degree of 
institutional continuity in the aftermath of contaminated factor products. Even if HIV-infected 
people with hemophilia failed to become “People Who Will Not Go Away” in the popular 
imagination, many of them did still live on even as other actors in the world of hemophilia 
moved forward from the scourge of AIDS. Their experiences still matter in ways that later 
leaders and institutions in the world of hemophilia refuse to acknowledge, and remembering their 
struggles may help us avoid a similar fate. 
Memorializing the Epidemic 
   The first problem facing this new hemophilia community was that of remembrance. Who 
had the right to memorialize or historicize the era of tainted factor products in America, and 
which of those accounts should the community embrace moving forwards? The community’s 
understanding of its own infection would ultimately determine how it approached all other issues 
that implicated or echoed this painful history, so in many ways this issue lay at the heart of post-
Hubbert 71 
 
contaminated factor hemophilia politics. Crucially, people with hemophilia were not the only 
group interested in controlling or influencing the public’s understanding of the contaminated 
factor epidemic. Factor companies, NHF insiders, physicians, and even government regulators 
all were connected to this story in one way or another, and each of these groups attempted to 
codify their own understanding of the hemophilia community’s experience with HIV into a 
durable historical record. While the idea of a totally “detached” historian with no personal 
connection to their research is of course a myth, one notable quirk of hemophilia historiography 
is the sheer number of researchers and authors who were also important actors in the events they 
worked to memorialize. 
 The first group to tell the story of contaminated hemophilia products were members of 
the community themselves, who drew upon personal experience to historicize the scourge of 
AIDS. Many members of the hemophilia community wrote about this history for explicitly 
political ends, hopeful that their accounts of the not-so-distant past could clarify the community’s 
path forwards into the future. Elaine DePrince, for instance, wrote Cry Bloody Murder to educate 
Congresspeople who were confused by the tangled paper trail that people with hemophilia 
submitted as evidence of corporate malfeasance.4 Elaine argued that learning the hemophilia 
community’s history could help us avoid repeating it, writing in the introduction of Cry Bloody 
Murder that “if we become informed, alert, and questioning consumers in the matter of medical 
treatment, perhaps we can avoid something similar happening in the future.”5  
  Another distinctive feature of accounts of hemophilia and AIDS written by community 
members is their dual focus on the bird’s eye and ground level perspectives on infection. Dying 
 
4 Personal conversations. 
5 Elaine DePrince, Cry Bloody Murder: A Tale of Tainted Blood (New York: Random House, 1997), xi. 
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in Vein, for instance, is a community-produced collection of photos and testimonies from HIV-
positive people with hemophilia, intercut with dramatic quotes from the IOM report and detailed 
historical timelines that chronicled the industry’s inaction in the face of AIDS. Later issues of 
The Common Factor operated in a similar method, juxtaposing the latest findings of COTT’s 
historical investigations into HIV/AIDS against a never-ending stream of obituaries for people 
with hemophilia who died of AIDS-related complications. By presenting these dramatically 
different perspectives on AIDS side by side, people with hemophilia highlighted the causal 
relationship between corporate inaction and personal tragedy. They put human faces to an 
otherwise abstract story of big pharma run amok, forcing the reader to reckon with the tangible 
effects of contaminated factor. 
  These stories, however, represent only a small fraction of the myriad tragedies that the 
hemophilia community experienced because of tainted clotting factors. Many people who 
contracted HIV through clotting factor died before they could create a durable account of their 
experiences that might outlive them. Many chose to remain “in the closet,” unwilling to speak up 
about their experiences with AIDS in such a hostile and intolerant political climate. Of that small 
remaining group of community members who lived long enough to document their history and 
chose to share their experiences with the world, only a few were lucky enough to attract enough 
attention that their story meaningfully permeated the historical record. I got just a small glimpse 
at the huge unheard body of narratives beneath the layers of official history when I visited the 
Hemophilia Federation of America’s history room, where HFA keeps various documents and 
artifacts that community members have donated to them. There, among the published books and 
scholarly articles, was a huge mass of unexamined diaries, photo albums, and letters. As I 
considered this substantial body of unincorporated narratives, I was struck by how little we really 
Hubbert 73 
 
know about the various ways that people with hemophilia experienced HIV. Who were these 
people who produced these objects? What stories did they have to tell, and how had their 
exclusion from mainstream historiography warped our understanding of the trauma that people 
with hemophilia collectively experienced? 
  Unfortunately, I was unable to answer these questions. When I spoke to HFA staff about 
the room, they said they weren’t sure if all the various families and individuals who donated 
materials had given any clear guidance on how they wanted their donations to be used. To avoid 
any breach of privacy, I confined my research of HFA’s materials to sources that they were 
positive had been made publicly available during the AIDS crisis and its aftermath. That glimpse 
of those stacked-up crates, however, has stayed with me throughout this project. Even that 
collection of sources, as large as it might seem, is only a tiny fraction of the various perspectives 
on the AIDS crisis from people in the hemophilia community that have been lost to history. 
  This scarcity of primary sources is conspicuous in many aspects of hemophilia 
historiography, and looms over the entire field. Consider, for instance, all the various memos and 
pieces of correspondence that people with hemophilia managed to pry from the factor companies 
through leaks or lawsuits. Many have never been digitized, and were either disposed of by a dead 
community member’s surviving relative or lie abandoned in dusty boxes. Thousands more 
documents full of pertinent information were presumably never released to the public, and lie 
behind closed doors if they still exist at all. Like HFA’s stack of diaries or vague recollections of 
important community publications that were lost in a move, the absence of these sources is in of 
itself historically noteworthy. It serves as a reminder of just how little scholars really know about 
the experiences of the people who suffered during this crisis, directing our focus away from what 
we do know toward what we do not. Whatever other conditions of hemophilia history we can 
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identify, perhaps the most essential characteristic worth remembering is its all-too-common 
absence. 
  In the vacuum that a more complete account of the crisis might have filled, various other 
storytellers have stepped up to codify their own recollections and beliefs about the HIV epidemic 
into history. Factor companies, for instance, continued with the strategies they had adopted in the 
90s by depicting themselves as faultless actors who had been unjustly blamed for an 
unforeseeable catastrophe. Their rhetorical approach was put to the test in 1995, when the IOM 
committee finally published its report. As discussed in both Chapters 1 and 2, the IOM report 
conspicuously refuses to assign culpability to individual pharmaceutical companies or regulators. 
It instead discusses the mismanagement of hemophilia care in only the most general terms, 
discussing fundamentally unsound chains of information and authority that precluded a strong 
and decisive response to AIDS. Even though this account of the hemophilia community’s 
infection mostly aligned with the industry’s claims of innocence, it still rankled certain blood 
product manufacturers. James Reilly, the President of the plasma industry’s trade group ABRA, 
for instance, complained to the Senate in his post-IOM report remarks that “many of the IOM’s 
findings and conclusions are without foundation and are incorrect.”6 He applauded Secretary of 
Health Donna Shalala’s comments about the danger of hindsight when applying blame for 
decisions made in a time of great uncertainty, and said ABRA “support[ed] her desire not to 
examine the past to assign blame, but rather to ensure a safer blood supply in the future.”7 
 
6 H. Rept. 104-746, Protecting the Nation’s Blood Supply from Infectious Agents: New Standards, Tenth Report by 
the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Together with Additional Views, 104 Cong. 2 (1996) 
(testimony of James Reilly). 
7 Reilly, testimony on Protecting the Nation’s Blood Supply. 
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  This “let’s move forward rather than pointing fingers!” mentality runs rampant in the 
industry’s rhetorical responses to almost all histories of hemophilia and AIDS that depict them as 
corrupt or even inept. This approach was taken up by the IOM, and has seen tepid acceptance 
from certain academic historians who list a story’s capacity to “heal the community” alongside 
strict accuracy as two competing interests worth balancing. Moving forward past a tragedy is 
useless, however, unless you have internalized the right lessons from it. As DePrince reminds us, 
people with hemophilia and people with serious illnesses more generally must become 
“informed, alert, and questioning consumers” if we want to avoid similar catastrophes caused by 
medical neglect in the future. Forgetting this history, as difficult as remembering it might be, is 
antithetical to that stated goal.  
  Outspoken activists like Durbin and DePrince are not the only ones to bemoan the 
reluctance of mainstream historians to confront the plight of HIV-infected people with 
hemophilia. They have been echoed by academics like the medical sociologists Keshavjee, 
Weiser, and Kleinman from the Harvard Medical School, who penned an article in 2001 
criticizing the IOM committee for its failure to honestly reckon with the hemophilia HIV crisis. 
Keshavjee et. al. write that  
By viewing the events of the 1980s as a failure of process, the IOM Report dissipated any 
moral culpability for the catastrophe. Instead of addressing the moral questions raised by 
the contamination of the blood supply, the Report converted the suffering of the 
hemophilia community into policy analysis and an exercise in the study of better 
management and regulatory oversight.8 
 
8 Salmaan Keshavjee, Sheri Weiser, and Arthur Kleinman, “Medicine Betrayed: Hemophilia and HIV in the US,” 
Social Science & Medicine 53, no. 8 (2001): 1089. doi:10.1016/s0277-9536(00)00403-2. 
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Because of this institutional failure to historicize the crisis, the trio writes, much of the 
hemophilia community’s pain has largely been excluded from the official record. They draw 
parallels between the hemophilia’s subaltern memory of collective loss and other recollections of 
similarly traumatic catastrophes, writing that the hemophilia community’s understanding of its 
own infection echoes that of “Holocaust survivors, atomic bomb survivors, Vietnam war 
veterans, refugees from political violence and sufferers of natural disasters.”9 Tying all these 
groups together is their shared experiences with traumatic events that both inherently resist 
historization and attract critics that would rather see them forgotten, creating a layer of unspoken 
recollection that resides below official history. Citing the work of literary critic and Holocaust 
scholar Lawrence Langer, Keshavjee and his peers call this unspoken understanding of the 
hemophilia community’s loss a form of “deep memory.”10 
  Factor companies were not the only recounters of hemophilia history who felt ill at ease 
with attempts to clarify these questions of responsibility and complicity. Dr. Evatt of the CDC 
learned that lesson in 2006, when he wrote a retrospective account of the hemophilia 
community’s experiences with AIDS in The Journal of Thrombosis and Haemostasis. Evatt was 
very critical of the factor companies, the FDA, and the medical experts at MASAC who urged 
NHF to stay the course. He argued that an entire generation of people with hemophilia could 
have been saved if these actors had heeded the CDC’s warnings quicker or devoted more energy 
to developing safe products before HIV/AIDS arrived onto the scene.11 Unsurprisingly, Evatt’s 
conclusions provoked controversy. His most vocal critic was probably Dr. Aledort, who played a 
 
9 Keshavjee, Weiser, and Kleinman, “Medicine Betrayed,” 1090. 
10 Keshavjee, Weiser, and Kleinman, “Medicine Betrayed,” 1090. 
11 B.L. Evatt, “The Tragic History of AIDS in the Hemophilia Population, 1982–1984,” Journal of Thrombosis and 
Haemostasis 4, no. 11 (2006): 2298, doi:10.1111/j.1538-7836.2006.02213.x. 
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critical role in convincing NHF’s MASAC counsel to adopt a conservative response to AIDS in 
the 80s. In a 2007 response to Evatt’s article that appeared in the same journal, Aledort wrote 
that  
Almost 25 years after the first hemophilia patient developed clinical manifestations of 
HIV, a paper has been written vilifying treaters, the blood‐manufacturing industry and the 
blood‐banking industry. At a time when patients with hemophilia are beginning to move 
forward on this terrible issue, this self‐serving, inaccurate paper demands documentation 
and/or its correction.12 
Like the factor companies, Aledort uses bromides about the virtues of “moving forward” to 
attack historical attempts to uncover the past. He makes this point even more explicit toward the 
end of his paper, concluding that “One can never argue about the virtue of revisiting history, but 
this is a prime example of rewriting history. Now is the time of healing, not finger‐pointing.”13 
Evatt, for his part, remained unconvinced by these arguments. He wrote a cursory response to 
Aledort in the very same issue of the journal, suggesting in an understated academic voice that 
“the historical facts and concepts that Aledort implies were grievous omissions by the author are 
in fact Aledort’s redaction of facts and/or concepts clearly presented and well referenced in the 
article. The reader is urged to refer to the article and its references if additional clarity is 
needed.”14  
  It’s easy to recall Aledort’s role in this history of hemophilia and HIV and consider how 
that role might shape his recollection of this history, but it’s equally important that we remember 
Evatt’s role in these events and consider its effects on his recollections as well. Evatt, like 
 
12 L.M. Aledort, “HIV and Hemophilia,” Journal of Thrombosis and Haemostasis 5, no. 3 (2007): 607, 
doi:10.1111/j.1538-7836.2007.02371.x. 
13 Aledort, “HIV and Hemophilia,” 608. 





Aledort, wielded considerable institutional power at a time where institutions sat idly by as 
people with hemophilia used contaminated factor in complete ignorance. The historical record 
generally supports Evatt’s claim that he and his colleagues at the CDC were consistent and 
diligent advocates for the hemophilia community long before their peers recognized the risks of 
HIV, but the fact that Evatt is an important author in the primary and secondary literature of that 
historical record should give us pause.  
  In this, of course, Evatt is not alone. Many seminal histories of the hemophilia AIDS 
epidemic were written by authors who played important roles in that history. Susan Resnik’s 
Blood Saga, for instance, has been an invaluable resource for me throughout this project. Yet 
Resnik is an ex-NHF employee, albeit one who left the organization a few years before the 
emergence of HIV in the blood supply. Knowledge of Resnik’s time at NHF informs our 
understanding of certain historical conclusions she comes to, such as her decision to clearly 
separate the “golden years” of hemophilia from the “years of AIDS” and her reticence to 
examine the community belief that NHF’s reliance on the factor industry made them ineffectual 
advocates. As a result of Resnik’s connections, some members of the community have rejected 
her account of this history entirely. One anonymous commenter on Amazon, for instance, writes 
“Shame on the author for participating in the widespread ‘sweeping under the carpet’” before 
accusing Resnik’s account of glossing over the way that “National Hemophilia Foundation sold 
their soul by taking big payments from these companies.”15 This user who wrote this comment 
problematizes Resnik’s work by invoking what Langer would call “deep memory” of the 
contaminated factor crisis, calling attention to the ways that mainstream historiography has 
 
15 Butterfly8888, January 18, 2010, customer review on Amazon storefront, “Blood Saga: Hemophilia, AIDS, and 




excluded the hemophilia community’s understanding of its own infection. By the same token, 
however, a certain belief is not true simply because members of the hemophilia community 
believe it. Conspiracy theories and unsupported beliefs about this history still abound in the 
hemophilia community even to this day, and there is much to be done when it comes to 
untangling fact from fiction in both official and unofficial accounts of the contaminated factor 
crisis.  
  These problem of authorship in hemophilia/AIDS remembrance extend beyond scholarly 
history and personal autobiography, and will continue to crop up in other issues examined in this 
chapter. Key individuals and institutions in the world of hemophilia have tried to memorialize 
the community’s history in a range of mediums to serve a variety of ends, and each of these 
attempts has spawned its own unique discourse. The question of a physical hemophilia AIDS 
memorial, for instance, has been the subject of considerable controversy over the last three 
decades. Even as early as 1999, COTT had begun to call for a permanent memorial dedicated to 
people with hemophilia who had died of AIDS. Despite widespread enthusiasm, people with 
hemophilia struggled to find space and money to erect such a monument. Prospects for a 
permanent memorial seemed dim until 2016, when NHF announced that they had negotiated an 
agreement for a small memorial for people with hemophilia inside the AIDS Memorial Grove.  
  Although most members of the community welcomed the news, NHF and the Grove’s 
specific vision for the memorial sparked two small controversies. The first had to do with NHF’s 
proposed dedication of the memorial: they had initially planned for the monument’s plaque to 
mention their own role in securing the site, which angered community members who believed 
that NHF had failed them in the 80s. NHF ultimately agreed to determine the plaque’s inscription 
through a community vote, which decisively shot down any idea of using the memorial to lionize 
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the organization.16 The second (far uglier) controversy came from people with hemophilia who 
objected to the location of the site itself. Falling back on claims of “special victim” status and 
base homophobia, they argued that people with hemophilia were fundamentally different than 
the other victims of AIDS who were memorialized in the grove. NHF and the Grove made no 
concessions to this second group, thus implicitly rebuking those members of the hemophilia 
community who wanted to carry on this old “hemo-homo war” decades after the blood supply 
had been secured. 
Contested Legacies of AIDS in the Hemophilia Community 
  Indeed, the still-ongoing relationship between gay men and people with hemophilia is 
perhaps the best place to begin as we transition from a discussion of hemophilia memory to an 
exploration of how that memory has shaped more recent politics. People with hemophilia and 
gay men have historicized the role of people with hemophilia in AIDS advocacy in very different 
ways, and these divergent theories about hemophilia politics have informed more recent 
moments where the interests of these groups intersect or diverge. People with hemophilia, for 
their part, mostly view themselves as a relatively innocent party. If they did not actually stand in 
solidarity with gay men, the thinking goes, then they at least refused to be actively complicit in 
homophobic rhetoric that might have won them friends on the right. One NHF employee who 
worked at the organization during the 90s offered this view to Susan Resnik during interviews 
she conducted for Blood Saga, explaining that “We were then approached by . . . right-wing 
groups to engage the National Hemophilia Foundation in this war against ‘sin.’ . . . I’m really 
 




proud of the role of the hemophilia community in resisting these demagogues.”17 Gay men, on 
the other hand, often had far less rosy memories of the hemophilia community’s involvement in 
AIDS politics. Gay historian Jeffery Bennett argues that the hemophilia community explicitly 
threw gay men under the bus in his book Banning Queer Blood, concluding that “hemophiliac 
organizations in the past frequently adopted a language that was explicitly homophobic in order 
to advance their goals. Such organizing was so successful that Congress passed the Ricky Ray 
Act.”18 He also argues that people with hemophilia continue to prop up a ban on gay blood 
donors both implicitly and explicitly, concluding that the community still occupies a central 
space in “discourses that isolate those who were “innocent victims” from those who ‘deserved’ 
AIDS.”19 
  Both recollections of hemophilia AIDS politics have been invoked in recent memory 
during political battles over the FDA’s policy of gay blood donor exclusion. Starting in 2006, the 
FDA began to revisit the lifetime ban on gay men donating blood every two years. Each of these 
biannual reviews provoked a flurry of media inquiry about the ban, which in turn brought people 
with hemophilia and gay men back into discourse about the ban and its history. In 2008, for 
instance, NHF’s CEO Val Bias told reporters at a Chicago-based news syndicate that he believed 
the policy should stand unchanged. Invoking that age-old paradigm that pitted the lives of people 
with hemophilia against the rights of gay men to live without stigma and ignoring the decades’ 
worth of science that had changed that calculation, Bias asked “why fix anything that is 
working? It’s just really not worth it…Everyone has rights. But I don’t think that anyone has the 
 
17 Susan Resnik, Blood Saga: Hemophilia, AIDS, and the Survival of a Community, Updated Edition with a New 
Preface (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 128. 
18 Jeffery A. Bennett, Banning Queer Blood: Rhetorics of Citizenship, Contagion, and Resistance (Tuscaloosa: 
University of Alabama Press, 2009), 74. 
19 Bennett, Banning Queer Blood, 56. 
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right to put someone else at risk.”20 Two years later, at the height of the ban’s 2010 coverage, 
Gay Men’s Health Crisis released a report on the policy titled “A Drive for Change: Reforming 
U.S. Blood Donation Policies” that called for its immediate end. While speaking to editors at the 
HIV-focused magazine POZ, GMHC director and report editor Dr. Sean Cahill suggested that 
“Many policies adopted toward HIV a quarter century ago were based on fear, prejudice, 
homophobia and ideology—not science and compassion.”21 Although Cahill leaves it to the 
reader to decide which exact policies he is referring to, the FDA infamously codified its 
previously-provisionary 1983 ban on MSM men donating blood into permanent policy in 1986. 
HIV tests were still unreliable and new at that time, and gay men made up the largest at-risk 
group for HIV that the CDC had identified. By arguing that the ban had always been based on 
“fear, prejudice, homophobia and ideology,” Cahill suggested that the people with hemophilia 
who vociferously argued for the ban during that uncertain time were guilty of all the above.  
  Although important organizations like GHMC and NHF fought over the blood ban by 
invoking these diametrically opposed visions of hemophilia politics, they also tactically revised, 
softened, or even reconciled these visions of the hemophilia community’s past in attempts to find 
common ground. In 2008, for instance, GHMC and NHF co-authored a letter with a variety of 
other gay and hemophilia interest groups to “clarify a recently encountered misperception” that 
there was a “disconnect between the positions of leading gay rights and hemophilia 
representatives.”22 The authors went on to explain that their “communities have more in common 
 
20 Lisa M. Krieger, "FDA's Blood-Donation Ban: Does it Save Or Risk Lives?," McClatchy - Tribune News 
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22 AIDS Action Council et. al., “Joint Statement on Addressing the MSM Blood Ban by Groups Representing 




than current discourse reflects,” such as a common history in which they “worked toward shared 
goals, including caring for people living with HIV and preventing the virus’s spread.”23 
Importantly, the letter does not engage in total historical revisionism by suggesting that gay men 
and people with hemophilia always or even often worked together toward those goals, merely 
that the goals themselves were shared. It ends with a tepid affirmation that both communities 
support revising the ban in accordance with new science, conveniently leaving out the larger 
point that the organizations representing these populations did not actually agree on what a 
science-based approach entailed. This letter, after all, was written contemporaneously with 
Cahill’s suggestion that the science never called for a ban, and two years before Bias’s 
suggestion that the science still called for a ban. Over time, however, this hybrid version of 
hemophilia history that emphasized the common priorities and causes that people with 
hemophilia shared with gay men slowly facilitated a compromise. In 2012, Val Bias told 
reporters for the Washington Times that lifting the ban still called for more research, but also 
said he was “encouraged” by recent data and would “continue to work with all interested parties” 
to create a policy based on new science.24 When the FDA finally revised the ban in 2014, they 
did so with NHF’s blessing. 
  Although this limited treatment of hemophilia memory in the blood ban debate reduces 
the total of possible viewpoints to two diametrically opposed options that slowly converged, it’s 
important to remember that there was a considerable diversity of perspectives not represented by 
this dominant framework. COTT, for instance, spoke out against the blood ban long before its 
eventual overturn. In a private letter to Dr. Jay Epstein at the FDA’s Office of Blood Research 
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written in 1997, COTT’s Medical Committee condemned the MSM policy for its “existing bias 
regarding gay and bisexual men” before demanding a policy based on “behaviors associated the 
transmission of virus rather than on specific individuals or communities.”25 By the same token, 
gay rights groups and activists usually acknowledged that a ban was more defensible in 1983 
than it was in 2010. Some went even further by alleging that some limited ban might still be 
necessary, such as gay legal scholar Adam Pulver. In 2008, Pulver wrote a relatively vigorous 
defense of the blood ban titled “Gay Blood Revisionism.” Like the title suggests, Pulver argued 
that younger college-based LGBT activists that pushed for a wholesale lifting of the ban suffered 
from a “lack of memory of the AIDS crisis.”26 Although he did not offer any answers to these 
questions, Pulver also argued that any debate about the ban hinged on determinations about 
“what is an acceptable risk, and what increase in risk is ethically justified in order to reduce 
feelings of stigma.”27 COTT’s relatively quick rejection of the ban and Pulver’s relatively slow 
rejection of it demonstrate that neither people with hemophilia nor gay men adopted uniform 
positions about how hemophilia history should inform policy makers’ attitudes on the blood ban. 
  Invocations of the hemophilia community’s experience with AIDS have also appeared in 
debates over the extent and nature of the relationships that various stakeholders in the world of 
hemophilia should form with one another. These stakeholders are too numerous for all their 
interconnected relationships with one another to be discussed in detail, but they include doctors, 
industry/industry representatives, community organizations, regulatory agencies, and individual 
patients. Running through all these relationships that comprise the post-AIDS world of 
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hemophilia is an awareness that each of these stakeholders possesses their own unique set of 
interests and incentives. The optimistic view of hemophilia care, which situated all these groups’ 
interests in easy alignment with one another, has been irreparably ruptured by the trauma of 
AIDS. Stakeholders can form tactical alliances with one group or another or even proclaim their 
universally benevolent intentions by either reframing or eliding over hemophilia history to suit 
their purposes, but the community’s “deep memory” of the AIDS crisis has thus far prevented 
people with hemophilia from totally forgetting how many of these stakeholders put their personal 
interests over the community’s collective safety when HIV entered the blood supply. 
  Medical providers were one group to lose considerable prestige from this re-evaluation. 
At the height of hemophilia AIDS activism, certain physicians who urged patients to “stay the 
course” on clotting factor were reviled. Aledort, for instance, was called the “Joseph Mengele” 
of the “hemophilia Holocaust” by certain activists who blamed him for NHF’s inaction. More 
common than these specific attacks, however, was a general sense that the entire medical 
profession had failed people with hemophilia. Unlike some other radical community beliefs that 
challenged established centers of power, this institutional distrust of the medical profession has 
seen considerable attention in secondary literature about the contaminated factor crisis. 
Keshavjee, Weiser, and Kleinman cite the testimony of several people with hemophilia at the 
IOM committee hearings to demonstrate this distrust in a section of their paper titled Physicians: 
care givers or care sellers?, concluding with Joey Lawson’s remark that “Never again will I trust 
the medical profession. How can I?” to drive their point home.28  
 
28 Keshavjee, Weiser, and Kleinman, “Medicine Betrayed,” 1084. 
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  Potential conflicts of interest still abound for professional caregivers working in 
hemophilia. Federal funding for the Hemophilia Treatment Center (HTC) program has stayed 
stagnant over the past few decades, even as inflation and rising medical costs have made running 
an HTC program increasingly more expensive. Many HTCs have dealt with this problem by 
joining the 340B Drug Pricing Program, meeting federal standards set out in the Public Health 
Services Act of 1992 that allow a clinic to purchase and sell drugs at a discounted rate. 
Qualifying for 340B status essentially lets HTCs function as specialty pharmacies, which in turn 
lets them provide essential services to the community. According to one survey of HTCs 
conducted in 2018, “the majority of centers rely on 340B program income to fund > 90% of the 
staff time of nurses, social workers and physical therapists.”29 Although 340B status is certainly 
lucrative for HTCs, it also creates opportunities for a conflict of interest. Many HTCs that act as 
specialty pharmacies will not secure deals with all the various factor manufacturers, and rare 
HTCs that do supply most or even all the existing factor products will not receive equally 
lucrative deals from the various manufacturers. HTC hematologists can also raise money by 
using their clinics as nexuses to enlist patients into industry drug trials, monetizing their unusual 
relationship with patients to populate these studies with otherwise difficult-to-find people with 
hemophilia.  
  Taken together, these dual incentives undermine patient trust that their HTC’s 
recommendations are motivated by medical concerns rather than financial ones. In May 2009, 
Laurie Kelly (a “hemophilia mom” and community advocate) published an issue of her “Parent 
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Empowerment Newsletter” that was largely dedicated to navigating these issues with HTCs. 
Summarizing her experiences with HTCs who tried to enlist her son into their 340B, another 
hemophilia mother named Jane explained that “whether it’s a legitimate concern or not, it makes 
you think that money — and not necessarily patient care — is their motivating force. It 
undermines my confidence in the treatment we’re receiving.”30 Whether Jane made the parallel 
consciously or not, her remarks echo past critiques from hemophilia activists who alleged that 
their doctors prioritized industry money over patient safety. 
  Another relationship that can be examined through the prism of hemophilia history is the 
relationship between patient advocacy groups and the pharmaceutical industry. At the nadir of 
NHF’s guardianship over the community’s interests in the early 80s, NHF received around 20% 
of its operational budget from pharmaceutical corporations.31 When news about the full extent of 
this funding stream went public in the aftermath of the tainted factor crisis, grassroot hemophilia 
activists directly linked NHF’s funding with its conservative response to AIDS. Corey Dubin, for 
instance, wrote in 1994 that the “close relationship between the drug companies the NHF had 
tragic consequences…NHF continued to advise its members to use the blood products, advice we 
now know contributed to 10,000 HIV infections.”32 Although NHF did institute new safeguards 
like bolstered conflict of interest policies and additional preconditions that had to be met before 
accepting a grant, they never totally cut the tap. 
  When NHF refused to cut ties with industry, hemophilia activists responded by creating 
alternative organizations. Michael Rosenberg, for instance, wrote in 1991 that “We— the 
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alienated— do not identify with the hemophilia institutions. After all the debacle of the 80s, we 
do not need an organization that cozies up to the corporate factor makers; we do not need an 
organization that can be bought off cheaply with small grants and PR gimmicks.”33 COTT 
realized Rosenberg’s vision in 1994, creating a split-away organization that they claimed would 
advocate for the hemophilia community’s holistic needs without industry money. COTT leaders 
called this patient-focused alternative the Hemophilia Federation of America (HFA), and 
presented it as an authentically grassroots alternative to NHF. Only 6 years later, however, HFA 
caved to the financial realities of running an active patient advocacy org without industry support 
and formally reversed its policy of financial independence from pharmaceutical corporations. 
Although they too implemented extensive conflict of interest and transparency bylaws to guide 
these donations, they nevertheless departed from one of the major founding precepts of the 
original HFA vision. In their statement explaining the move, HFA wrote that  
The Hemophilia Federation of America believes that, unlike the actions of the past, 
industry is now more committed to ensuring product safety. The Hemophilia Federation 
of America believes furthermore that mandatory government regulations, commissions 
and other forms of oversight have greatly reduced the chance of history repeating itself, 
especially since these measures recognize and include meaningful community input.34 
Rather than a commitment to “never again” based on active vigilance against further 
catastrophes, HFA’s version of “never again” comes close to denying that such vigilance is even 
necessary in a modern world of hemophilia. No major patient organization has advocated for 
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people with hemophilia without accepting money from the corporations who produce hemophilia 
therapies since this decision in 2000. 
   In many ways, the hemophilia community does share common interests with the 
pharmaceutical industry. Pharmaceutical companies that produce factor only care that their 
product is bought at a steep cost, with very little preference toward who ultimately pays for it 
except insofar as the payer’s identity impacts sales. Hemophilia advocacy organizations, on the 
other hand, only care that patients can afford factor products, with very little preference on the 
cost that insurers ultimately pay for those drugs except insofar as that price impacts patient 
access. Hemophilia advocacy organizations and pharmaceutical companies thus work together in 
legislatures all around the country, advocating for state and federal governments to compel 
insurance companies who balk at the sky-high prices of clotting factors to offer robust, 
affordable plans that cover clotting factor for people with hemophilia. In 2016, for instance, 
researchers noted that the factor company then known as Baxter had given out almost 2 million 
dollars in advocacy grants to NHF and HFA chapters since 2003, often with stipulations that the 
groups would direct the money towards causes like conducting “grassroots advocacy campaigns, 
directed at key decision makers, in an effort to preserve quality of care.”35 Lest you feel too sad 
for the poor insurers, however, know that they are also well represented in the legislative 
process. Despite new protections for people with chronic health conditions such as the ACA, 
insurers and end payers are still hard at work trying to find ways to avoid paying for expensive 
specialty therapies like clotting factor.  
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  And make no mistake, modern clotting factors are expensive. After the debacle of 
contaminated factor products, the pharmaceutical industry responded to patient demands for a 
safer product by switching to synthetically derived factor molecules. These new products, known 
as “recombinant” clotting factors, first came to market in 1992 and have since become the de-
facto norm for people with hemophilia.36 Although recombinants have so far been incredibly 
safe therapies, they have also been incredibly expensive. In 2018, reporters from KHN wrote an 
article on high drug prices that cited data from PBM Express Scripts to estimate that the average 
adult male with complication-free hemophilia in America goes through about $270,000 worth of 
factor in a year.37 As hematologist Dr. Croteau explains it, “Many of these products were 
licensed in the early 1990s or 2000s, and while there are certainly new variations, especially in 
the FVIII market, there is not huge variability in characteristics…yet, they keep getting more 
expensive.”38  Because a relatively low number of sellers have consolidated majority control 
over the market, the factor industry has been described as an “oligopoly” and “fundamentally 
non-competitive” in recent scholarly literature.39 Even though the scourge of HIV has been 
eliminated from the blood supply, in other words, the market’s underlying predation on and 
commodification of people with hemophilia has by no means abated. 
  Despite these impositions, the same total reliance on the pharmaceutical industry that 
precluded an all-out legal war in 1992 and a factor strike in 1996 has also prevented people with 
hemophilia from aggressively pushing back against the industry’s prices. What’s more, many 
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people with hemophilia and organizations that advocated on their behalf were so relieved to see 
safer products that they accepted the higher price tag that came with them. One collaboratively 
authored paper on factor costs from 2002 commented that pharmaceutical companies relied on 
the community’s fears to set their own prices, noting that the promises of recombinant products 
appealed to “patients and doctors who, still in the shadow of viral epidemics spread through 
clotting factor, desire to have safer and purer products.”40 
  My brother was born right as the first recombinant products were created, and spent the 
first few years of his life on human product. When a recombinant alternative finally became 
available to people his age, the local HTC hematologist was adamant that our family should stay 
on human clotting factor. He said that the price tags for all the recombinant alternatives were 
exorbitant, and (correctly) pointed out that the modern-day blood products were far better 
screened, cleaned, and regulated than their primitive ancestors. Ultimately, my parents’ decision 
was made for them by an outbreak of vCJD that doctors feared might permeate the blood supply. 
My family, like thousands of others who were also slow to adopt recombinants, responded to the 
news by instantly abandoning human factor in fear that history might repeat itself.  
   Despite high costs and past betrayals, patient advocacy institutions in the hemophilia 
community have put aside their differences with the factor companies to pursue common goals. 
Perhaps because of their high costs and past betrayals, factor companies have been unusually 
eager to forge close relationships with patient advocacy organizations. Although NHF does not 
publish full breakdowns of the donations they receive, publicly available information does paint 
a stark picture of the industry’s role in their continued financial stability. NHF’s current 
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operating budget has almost tripled from its 2002 appraisal at ~7 million dollars, with most of 
that growth coming from contributions.41 Donation information is not available for all the 
various factor companies, but Pfizer reported donating $1,115,000 to NHF’s central office and 
various decentralized chapters in 2015.42 Crucially, most of this money is not oriented towards 
advocacy. During my own time in the community, I have seen factor companies sponsor chapter 
summer camps, college scholarships, financial hardship support funds, annual symposiums, 
“healthy living” excursions, and professional development workshops for young adults. They 
also fill community organizations’ pocketbooks by buying advertisements in magazines like 
NHF’s Hemaware, which researchers have found consistently violate or bend FDA regulations 
on honest advertising by exaggerating the benefits of new products and downplaying the risks.43 
All told, these various fundraising streams ensure that the hemophilia community is constantly 
awash with industry cash.  
  The fact that the very organizations that would ideally critique these relationships are in 
fact participating them has dampened the community’s response, but many people with 
hemophilia are aware of these fundamental conflicts. Several of them whom I’ve met during my 
time in the community have characterized these funds as “blood money,” and questioned how 
industry dollars influence the policy goals of advocacy organizations. Others have drawn 
parallels between industry’s current ties to the community and the connections it forged before 
the HIV crisis, arguing that these methods of influence peddling undermined the community’s 
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capacity for independent advocacy in the face of AIDS. Although she does not make this 
connection explicitly, Susan Resnik’s description of historical tactics that factor companies used 
to curry favor with NHF in the 70s does suggest certain striking parallels. Resnik quotes one 
Hyland Laboratories sales representative who thought that this feature of the industry’s 
involvement in the community was particularly interesting, recalling that “I find all of the 
manufacturers and representatives of the companies involved in many, many ways. And there is 
a range of things: participating in summer camps, participating in . . . workshops that the families 
attend, and trying to help the nurse coordinators.”44 HFA and NHF are certainly far more 
independent and autonomous than the advocacy organizations of yesteryear, but the fact that 
current day-programs they offer echo this description so uncannily should give us pause. 
 Although some of these more egregious programs already stretch the boundaries of 
professional proprietary past the breaking point, many manufacturers working in hemophilia care 
have gone ever father by wooing customers through channels that bypass advocacy organizations 
all together. Pharmaceutical sales reps, for instance, have historically volunteered at the camps 
that their employers financed to form early connections with prospective customers. Sales reps 
can then build upon these relationships that they forge during community events with a variety of 
tactics, including paid meals out with their “friends,” professional development trainings and 
scholarships for people with hemophilia, and even offers of paid consulting/speaking 
opportunities, all in the hopes that the patient might eventually agree to switch brands.45 As a 
patient who has been on the receiving end of all these tactics and more, I can personally attest to 
their ubiquity in the hemophilia community today. In their paper on these strategies, Philip 
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Kucab (a person with hemophilia) and his co-authors convincingly make a case that “Factor 
manufacturers target many individuals with hemophilia using strategies similar to those used to 
market drugs to physicians.”46 In a disease state where convincing three patients to switch 
products could represent over a million dollars’ worth of annual revenue, the primary rationale 
for these aggressive sales tactics is obvious. Less obvious, however, is the secondary effect that 
these marketing schemes create by obscuring the historical tensions between people with 
hemophilia and the corporations that profit from them. They suggest some common confluence 
of interests where none exists, and thus contribute to a broader crisis of amnesia about the 
pharmaceutical industry’s role in the HIV crisis. 
  To make these problems even more confusing, many of the sales representatives who 
work in this business of patient recruitment are community members themselves. As NHF’s vice 
president of public policy and stakeholder relations Michelle Rice explained to the New York 
Times in 2016, “There are a lot more patients that work in industry now than ever before.”47 It’s 
hard to begrudge people with hemophilia for making that decision. Many of them took these 
positions for their insurance, since finding plans that would cover someone with hemophilia and 
HIV was almost impossible before the ACA. Organizations in the hemophilia community have 
struggled to find approaches that recognize these individuals as both community members and 
industry representatives, with varying degrees of success. My local NHF chapter, for instance, 
banned certain community members from attending events geared toward new parents and 
created best practices for withholding certain information from board members who work for 
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pharmaceutical companies. Even (or perhaps especially) for community members who try to 
navigate their various roles ethically, these dual loyalties can pull them in divergent directions. 
As one individual with hemophilia who works as a sales rep explained to me, “I kind of look 
forward to the day when I don’t have a conflict, when I can speak to this truth. Cause right 
now…I can’t be credible when I have this kind of conflict, when I’m drinking the Kool-Aid.”48  
  Today, the line where community ends and industry begins is blurrier than ever. At a 
recent conference I attended, for instance, I learned that several huge Facebook groups for people 
with hemophilia were actually created by pharmaceutical representatives, who use them to find 
customers in their area and understand the community’s wants and needs. But even as this line 
between customer and seller has blurred, the various needs of both groups have remained 
separate and distinct. That divide rose to the surface of hemophilia politics most recently in 
2020, when the FDA rejected BioMarin’s New Drug Application for a novel hemophilia gene 
therapy called Roctavian. Despite BioMarin’s promises that the product would durably raise 
factor levels in hemophilia patients, the FDA found that long-term follow-ups with study 
participants showed a steep drop-off.49 When the Institute for Clinical and Economic Review 
(ICER) investigated the FDA’s decision, BioMarin submitted public comments arguing that the 
FDA placed too much weight on factor levels. Since the mutations that cause hemophilia can 
affect the potency of factor as well as its prevalence, they argued that the low bleed rates 
Roctavian patients experienced even with low factor levels might reflect increased factor 
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efficacy.50 As HFA and NHF pointed out in their own comments to ICER, however, this claim 
“has no basis in fact. It has not been peer-reviewed and the sponsor has submitted no evidence to 
support it as a hypothesis.”51  
  Fortunately, parallel institutions in hemophilia took NHF and HFA’s side of the matter. 
ICER called BioMarin’s claim a “post hoc explanation for results based on a small number of 
data points,” and the FDA held firm in its rejection.52 Although unsuccessful, BioMarin’s 
attempts to create scientific fact in service of financial interests unmistakably call to mind factor 
companies and blood bankers who insisted that the risk of AIDS was “one in a million” even in 
the face of compelling evidence. When news of the FDA’s decision went public, the value of 
BioMarin stock fell by more than 35%.53 People with hemophilia, on the other hand, were spared 
a substandard gene therapy that might have fallen short of BioMarin’s projections and prevented 
them from taking a future AAV-based therapy. Although the fact that the FDA prevented this 
outcome is certainly reassuring, the fact that they had to intervene in the first place is not. 
    In an era of safe recombinant factor and relatively expansive access to factor products, 
it’s easy for many members of the community to treat these misaligned interests as bygones of a 
darker age. Contrary to popular belief, however, new problems in hemophilia care like Roctavian 
demonstrate that these discrete incentives still matter. As such, the act of either remembering or 
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obscuring the hemophilia community’s history is a deeply political one, with huge implications 
for the community’s future. Although people with hemophilia have tried to memorialize and hold 
onto the community’s history, their efforts have been undermined and complicated by a variety 
of other actors who also share an interest in how these events are remembered in the current day.  
  Because this history can undermine or shatter the illusion that people with hemophilia 
can trust the institutions that preside over their care, remembering or memorializing it in certain 
ways can be a transgressive act. In 2014, for instance, a gay man with hemophilia named Justin 
Levesque used his local chapter’s annual meeting as a forum for a round table session about 
LBGTQ+ people in the community. Several members of the community criticized his decision in 
the aftermath of the meeting, including one unnamed person with hemophilia who asked Justin 
why he was “trying to bring AIDS back into our community.”54 The most obvious belief that 
these remarks convey is the bigoted conviction that gay men were responsible for the hemophilia 
community’s suffering. Beneath that relatively unpopular belief, however, is a second, far more 
common conviction that AIDS is a thing of the past in the hemophilia community. Far from 
being “people who will Not Go Away,” the thousands of people with hemophilia who contracted 
HIV through clotting factor have been half-erased from the community’s understanding of itself.  
  This mass amnesia is only possible because clotting factor is now safe, and new 
generations of people with hemophilia no longer fear that their diagnosis will bring them into 
contact with HIV-contaminated product. But although hemophilia clotting factors have been 
purged of HIV, the impulses and incentives that led to their contamination in the first place are 
still distinctive features in American healthcare today. None of this, of course, means that this 
 




history will inevitably repeat itself. American people with hemophilia will probably never face a 
second iatrogenic epidemic, and may even live to see a cure within my lifetime. Even if the 
hemophilia community’s road to a cure is a relatively smooth one, however, the fundamental 
problems in American healthcare that caused their mass infection will find new expressions in 
new crises. So long as it remains unchecked, the tendency to treat people with disabilities like 
commodities to be exploited will continue to produce outcomes like the hemophilia community’s 




 When I was in middle school, before I knew much about this history, I once attended a 
COTT open forum held at NHF’s annual meeting. According to several of the organizers who 
spoke that day, COTT had seized the conference room for the event without NHF’s knowledge 
or permission. Sitting in that room, I was struck by how few people my age had shown up. The 
older men with hemophilia, who I thought of as rarities in the community, had come out in force. 
I listened to them speak about the daily struggles of living with HIV, the sorrow and guilt of 
surviving when so many of their “blood brothers” had not, and the rage of knowing that those 
responsible had largely gotten off scot free. As I left that meeting, I re-entered the bright and 
cheery world of modern hemophilia shaken by what I had heard. Try as I might, I could not 
really comprehend the experiences of these survivors. I had no experience to compare to the 
trauma they spoke of, no frame of reference to even conceptualize the mass die-off that they had 
lived through. I wandered onto the annual meeting’s luxurious show floor in a daze, completely 
ignoring the various booths where I could pick up free age-appropriate toys branded with the 
names of the corporations that oversaw the infection of the men I had just listened to.  
  A few years later, I tried to explain the COTT meeting to another friend of mine with 
hemophilia. Noticing the obvious agitation that the memory provoked in me, my friend tried to 
provide reassurance. He told me that his parents obviously appreciated the sacrifice of the COTT 
activists, but also that they thought COTT’s politics were “stuck in the past.” Implicit in this 
statement, of course, is the idea that these politics are no longer adequate for the current moment, 
as if they are relics of a bygone age that have outlived their purpose. I filed that idea away and 
noticed a similar rejection of the past a few years later, while talking to a fellow member of the 
local hemophilia community about the retirement of our chapter’s old director. He explained that 
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the outgoing director had been exactly what the community needed during the epidemic, when 
people with hemophilia needed to organize and fight just to stay alive. Today, on the other hand, 
he explained that the chapter could use a new director with a fresh vision, who could draw in 
disengaged or new families and solicit charitable donations from investors.  
  To explain these moments of continuity and discontinuity, I turn to Lawrence Langer. In 
his work on memory and the Holocaust, Langer argues that survivors who deliberately relive a 
historical atrocity and non-survivors who reject these recollections are constants that transcend 
any one event. Rather than reading the inability of the survivor to move on as a symptom to be 
treated, Langer treats their testimonies of never-ending trauma as products of a sense of time that 
is durational rather than chronological. He writes that because historical atrocities continue to 
shape the present, survivors understand that “forgetting would be the ultimate desecration, a 
‘cure’ the ultimate illusion.”1 By proclaiming that the dismal past pervades the present, they 
create a view of reality which Langer calls “the alarmed vision,” which challenges the capacity 
of those who have not experienced such things to “‘normalize’ violence, disease, and other 
human abuses by placing them in the simple context of an agenda for improving the future.”2  
  Although a chronological recollection of hemophilia and AIDS is certainly more 
comforting than a durational one, an absolute rejection of the epidemic’s ongoing significance 
conceals more than it reveals. Contemplating this history of hemophilia and AIDS unnerves us, 
because it forces us to grapple with the fact that a medical system designed to offer relief to 
people with hemophilia ultimately became the delivery system for their deaths. It would be 
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easier to pretend that such things can be consigned to the past, and act as if we can condense the 
exploitation of the hemophilia community down to a specific moment in history. Rejecting that 
explanation leads us to the conclusion that the forces that produced this outcome still operate in 
American medicine today, which in turn suggests that our medical system has been infected with 
a spiritual disease that hijacks its infrastructure in order to turn it against the sick, the needy, and 
the vulnerable. As bleak as this perspective might seem, a bird’s eye view of hemophilia history 
does suggest that the urge to treat vulnerable people like objects to be exploited is a constant in 
American medicine under capitalism. The callous indifference toward human life that led Hyland 
representatives to think of sales when Bob Massie thought of crippled joints and pain reared its 
head again in Cutter’s decision to sell off its unscreened factor in foreign markets, and manifests 
itself today in new forms like the exorbitant costs of recombinant product and the underhanded 
direct-to-consumer sales tactics of the manufacturers.  
  Conceptualizing these things as manifestations of the same force should not lead us to 
despair, however. The American hemophilia community is no longer so vulnerable to the worst 
outcomes that can arise when health is treated as a commodity rather than a right, thanks to the 
tireless efforts of organizers who fought for justice and reform. Just as those community 
members joined with one another and even with those whom they shared almost nothing with 
besides an HIV diagnosis, so too can the modern American hemophilia community lend its 
resources and expertise to groups who face new iterations of these old abuses. This solidarity can 
only coalesce, however, if future generations of Americans with hemophilia confront their 
community’s past and avoid falling into complacency. The true danger of forgetting this history, 
in other words, is not just that such things might happen to the hemophilia community again, but 
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